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I.

INTRODUCTION

HEN viewed in the context of the cyclical progressions of
*$American politics,' the timing of the recently announced
Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG Guidelines) may portend a new, harder
hitting, more active antitrust policy on the horizon. 2 These political cycles suggest that a more active antitrust policy may be in the
offing. When the current cycle began in the 1960s, the United
States Supreme Court (the Warren Court) seemed to use section
7 of the Clayton Act 3 to invalidate any nontrivial acquisition of a
* Associate Professor of Economics, The City University of New York. B.A.
1962, Harvard University; J.D. 1967, Stanford University; Ph.D. 1975, Columbia
University.
1. A. SCHLEISHINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1986).
2. NAAG Horizontal Merger Guidelines, (CCH) Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No.
800 Pt. II, at 67 (March 16, 1987) [hereinafter NAAG Guidelines].
3. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the
Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, provides in part that: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of
the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of

(281)
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competitor. 4 The elimination of a significant rival by itself was
thought to infringe the complex of social and economic values
perceived by a majority of the Court to inform the statutory words
"may ...substantially.., lessen competition." ' 5 Apparently frustrated by this strict antimerger policy, Justice Stewart uttered his
famous remark in dissent in United States v. Von's Grocery Co.: "The
sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation under § 7, the
Government always wins."' 6 The Department of Justice's 1968
Merger Guidelines with its low concentration thresholds reflected
7
this case law.
The 1970s witnessed a growing disenchantment with an activist antimerger policy. The attack on the activist antitrust policy
the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets
of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." Id.
4. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Continental Can
Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271
(1964); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
5. Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
107 S.Ct. 1975 (1987).
6. 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting). In Von's Grocery,
Von's, ranked third among retail grocery store chains in the Los Angeles area,
acquired the sixth largest chain-Shopping Bag Food Stores. Their market
shares were 4.3% and 3.2% respectively, or a combined market share of 7.5%.
The acquisition was denied, although neither firm involved was really very big,
nor was the market highly concentrated by usual standards. The concentration
ratio in terms of the largest four firms, CR4, was 24.4% before the merger and
28.8% after.
7. See generally Department of Justice, 1968 Merger Guidelines, 2 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) (1968)
4510 (Aug. 9, 1968); ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) No. 360 at X-I to X-6 (June 4, 1968) (full text of Justice Department
Merger Guidelines). In particular, paragraphs 5 through 7 are indicative of the
stringent antimerger standards reflected in the guidelines. Paragraphs 5
through 7 state in full:
5. Market Highly Concentrated. In a market in which the shares of
the four largest firms amount to approximately 75% or more, the Department will ordinarily challenge mergers between firms accounting
for, approximately, the following percentages of the market:
Acquiring Firm

Acquired Firm

4%
10%
15% plus

4% or more
2% or more
1% or more

(percentages not shown in the above table should be interpolated proportionately to the percentages that are shown).
6. Market Less Highly Concentrated. In a market in which the
shares of the four largest firms amount to less than approximately 75%,
the Department will ordinarily challenge mergers between firms accounting for, approximately, the following percentages of the market:
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was led by "Chicago School" 8 theorists, who argued that efficiency is the only legitimate goal of antitrust policy. 9 In most extreme form, Chicago-oriented authors castigate those who
advocate any other goals, even those with clear support in legislative history (e.g., the desire to maintain a decentralized economy),
as populist nonsense.' 0 Changing economic conditions aided the
Chicago School attack. The erosion of the American producers'
market power by fiercely efficient foreign competitors tended to
make an activist antitrust policy less necessary. 1 ' Moreover, with
inflation and unemployment undermining hopes for a higher
standard of living, antitrust law was blamed for preventing efficient mergers and hindering American businesses from competAcquiring Firm
5%
10%
15%
20%
25% plus

Acquired Firm
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%

or
or
or
or
or

more
more
more
more
more

(percentages not shown in the above table should be interpolated proportionately to the percentages that are shown).
7. Market With Trend Toward Concentration. The Department applies an additional, stricter standard in determining whether to challenge mergers occurring in any market, not wholly unconcentrated, in
which there is a significant trend toward increased concentration. Such
a trend is considered to be present when the aggregate market share of
any grouping of the largest firms in the market from the two largest to
the eight largest has increased by approximately 7% or more of the
market over a period of time extending from any base year 5-10 years
prior to the merger (excluding any year in which some abnormal fluctuation in market shares occurred) up to the time of the merger. The
Department will ordinarily challenge any acquisition, by any firm in a
grouping of such largest firms whose market share amounts to approximately 2% or more.
Id.
Note, however, Baker and Blumenthal's comment on the 1968 Guidelines
which follows: "The day has long passed since the principle consistency of
merger litigation was that 'the Government always wins.' That former reality
had given the 1968 Merger Guidelines a special importance." Baker & Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and PreexistingLaw, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 311, 346 (1983).
8. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925
(1979).
9. "The only legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization
of consumer welfare." R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 51 (1978); accord GAF
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203, 1226 (S.D. N.Y. 1981); R. PosNER, ANTITRUST LAw 3-4 (1976); Calvani, Consumer Welfare is Prime Objective of Antitrust, Legal Times, Dec. 1984, at 24-31; see also 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW

103-113(c) (1978).

10. Sullivan, The New Merger Guidelines: An Afterward, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 632,
636 (1983).
11. See I. MAGAZINER & R. REICH, MINDING AMERICA'S BUSINESS, pt. 1
(1982).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1988

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 2

284

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33: p. 281

2
ing more successfully in domestic and international markets.'
In 1980, the election of Ronald Reagan as President reflected
the changed political mood of the country. Mr. Reagan promised
to restore the economy to its former vigor by reducing government regulation of business.' 3 A restricted vision of antitrust fit
nicely with the political philosophy and campaign commitment of
his administration.' 4 The Department of Justice's Horizontal
Merger Guidelines (DOJ Guidelines),' 5 announced in 1982 and
hastily revised in more lenient form two years later,' 6 reflected
that view. In actual practice, the Reagan administration's enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act has been still more lenient than the DOJ Guidelines.' 7 With the appointment of Reagan
nominees to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), it too
adopted a more conservative view of merger enforcement' 8 to the
degree that FTC Commissioner Bailey remarked in her dissent in

12. Fox, Introduction, (Symposium): 1982 Merger Guidelines: When Economists
Are Kings?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 281, 283 (1983).
13. Sheils, Thomas, Abraham & Lubenow, An Economic Dream in Peril, Newsweek, Sept. 8, 1980, at 50-51.
14. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L.
REV. 1140, 1140-46 (1981).
15. 1982 Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28, 493 (1982) [hereinafter 1982
DOJ Guidelines].
16. 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984) [hereinafter 1984
DOJ Guidelines]. The 1984 DOJ Guidelines increased the number of defenses
and added other factors which could reduce the significance of concentration
levels from 10 to 14; added a failing division to the failing firm defense; and
added an efficiency defense where the 1982 Guidelines indicated that the DOJ
would consider efficiency claims only in "extraordinary cases." In 1984, the
Guidelines changed the "five-percent market definition test to a flexible standard, defined the price for which an increase would be postulated in the market
definition standard as the prevailing price (even if such price is significantly
above marginal cost), changed the Post-Merger HHI below 1000 standard from
"the Department is unlikely to challenge mergers in this region" to "the Department will not challenge mergers falling in this region," and changed from a cautious approach to applying its market definition standards to foreign
competitors to one of applying its market definition standards equally to both
foreign and domestic firms. Statement Accompanying Release of Revised Merger Guidelines, 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (June 29, 1984). The 1984
DOJ Guidelines go substantially beyond clarification, enunciating changes in enforcement policy that are substantial in nature; these substantial changes will
prolong any merger cases that are brought by widening the opportunities for
defense. See generally Miller, Notes on the 1984 Merger Guidelines: Clarificationof the
Policy or Repeal of the Celler-Kefauver Act?, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 653 (1984).

17. 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1245, at 1056 (Dec. 19,
1985). For further discussion of the Reagan administration's lenient approach
to antitrust enforcement, see infra notes 144-85 and accompanying text.
18. When the FTC became "populist" in the late 1970s, Congress reigned
it in through legislation and cuts in appropriations. Baker & Blumenthal, supra
note 7, at 321.
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In re Echlin Manufacturing Co. that "[w]hat is emerging in Commission merger decisions is by and large the rule that, according to
the 'new' economic learning, a merger is almost always legal." 19
Thus, we have come full circle from Justice Stewart's diametrically
opposite remark in Von's Grocery two decades ago.
Four recent developments suggest that a new phase of the
cycle may be in the offing. First, there has been a wave of mergers
that have been notable in producing huge wealth transfers without any discernible increase in production or efficiency. 2 0 There
has also been growing public and congressional revulsion at the
excesses of 2financial
manipulation (e.g., leveraged buyouts, 2 1
"greenmail, " 2 "poison pills" 2 3), which are evidence that decision
making by corporate management in large corporations and by
corporate raiders may not be as effectively constrained by efficiency considerations as the apostles of a laissez-faire attitude toward mergers would have one believe. Second, the huge
American trade deficit appears to be generating an irresistible
momentum for protectionist legislation 24 which is likely to enhance the market power of domestic firms as well as their propensity to engage in explicit or implicit cartels. Moreover, the recent
rapid decline in the dollar relative to other currencies will, by altering the terms of trade in favor of American producers, have the
same effect as protectionist legislation: foreign producers will
have more difficulty competing in American markets. Just as the
slogan, "tariff is the most of trusts," was the rallying cry of those
who demanded the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 (as the
quid pro quo for the McKinley Tariff of that same year), 2 5 protectionist legislation and the fall of the dollar, which enhance the
19. 105 F.T.C. 410, 502-03 (1985) (Bailey, Comm'r, dissenting). Echlin involved a merger between two firms which manufactured carburetor kits.
Although the merging firms are the first and third largest, having market shares
of approximately 38% and 10% respectively, a majority of the FTC voted not to
challenge the merger because of competition from substitute products, low entry barriers, and the prospect of new technology. Id. at 413-18.
20. Business Week, Nov. 24, 1986, at 86; N.Y. Times,June 29, 1987, at D1;
see L. THUROW, DANGEROUS CURRENTS: THE STATE OF ECONOMICS, ch. 2 (1984).
21. See generally Note, Leveraged Buyout, Management Buyout, and Going Private
Corporate Control Transactions: Insider Trading or Efficient Market Economics?, 14
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 685 (1986).

22. See generally Comment, Greenmail: Can the Abuses Be Stopped, 80 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1271 (1986).
23. See generally Comment, Corporate Law-The "Poison Pill" as a Takeover Defense Tactic-Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1047

(1986).
24. N.Y. Times, July 9, 1987, at D1.
25. D. DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS

AND LAW

143 (1964); H.
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market power of domestic firms, are likely to agitate an activist
antimerger policy. Third, despite the Administration's lenient
antimerger policy, 26 the economic position of American firms vis
vis foreign firms in terms of productivity has not improved; in27
deed, the secular trend in productivity has continued to decline.
Fourth, dissatisfaction with the Reagan administration's lenient
merger policy caused the National Association of Attorneys Gen29
28
eral (NAAG), who are authorized, both by statute and case law
to enforce the federal antitrust laws, to take the unprecedented
step of issuing their own guidelines for the enforcement of the
federal antitrust laws. The NAAG vertical restraint guidelines
were announced in 1985,30 and the horizontal merger guidelines
31
announced in 1987.
Because political economy is not an exact science and cannot
prove conclusively whether an aggressive or a conservative antitrust policy is more conducive to greater public benefit, political
and intellectual cycles or fashions have been and will continue to
be very important to understand, to analyze and, indeed, to shape
the subject of political economy. For example, if we consider the
phenomenon of a market in which a dominant firm survives unchallenged and earns supernormal profits for a considerable period of time, we shall see that economists who use different
models to interpret this phenomenon arrive at different conclusions. There are two differences in the models used: one focuses
on the concept of barriers to entry into such a market, the other
focuses primarily on the presumed efficiency of large firms. ChiTHE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 164-232 (1954); Letwin, Congress and the Sherman
Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221 (1956).
26. For a discussion of the Reagan administration's lenient enforcement attitude and practice, see infra text accompanying notes 149-85.
27. N.Y. Times, June 29, 1987, at DI; see also L. THUROW, supra note 20, ch.
20.

28. The Clayton Act, section 4C, states in pertinent part:

(1) Any attorney general of a State may bring a civil action in the
name of such State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in such State, in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the defendant, to secure monetary relief as provided in
this section for injury sustained by such natural persons to their property by reason of any violation of sections 1 to 7 of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(l) (1982).
29. The authority of the Attorney General of a State to invoke section 7 of
the Clayton Act to enjoin a merger injurious to the general welfare and economy
of a State is confirmed in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
30. NAAG s Vertical Restraint Guidelines, 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1245, at 996 (Dec. 5, 1985).
31. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, at pt. 11-67.
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cago School authors believe that competition erodes entry barriers rather quickly (with the exception of governmentally imposed
barriers); therefore, Chicago School authors conclude that if a
firm has a long-term record of profitability, it must be due to efficiency. 32 Chicago School opponents, on the other hand, maintain
that the sustained profitability of many firms is not due to efficiency but due to durable barriers to entry, such as advertising
intensity, scale economies, absolute capital requirements, naturalresource monopoly, patent protection, strategic predation 33 and
the like.3 4 In the 1980's, the laissez-faire conclusions of the Chicago School model have appeared to be more consonant with the
conservative phase of the American political cycle. However, if
this conservative phase has about run its course, the conclusions
of models that emphasize the need for a more active antitrust policy may again become fashionable.
Part II is a summary of the article's conclusions. Part III contrasts the antitrust philosophies and policies underlying the DOJ
and NAAG Guidelines. Part IV explains the three step process
that both DOJ and NAAG Guidelines use to determine whether a
merger may substantially lessen competition. Part V contains an
analysis of the DOJ and NAAG product and geographic market
definition standards in the context of recent merger cases and
consent degrees. In Part VI, the stated concentration level standard of the DOJ (which was also adopted by the NAAG) is compared to the DOJ's actual performance as indicated by merger
cases and consent decrees. In Part VII, other factors (e.g., ease of
32. Demsetz, Two Systems of BeliefAbout Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 164 (H. Goldschmid, H.M. Mann, andJ. Weston, eds.
1974); see also G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 72-80 (1968);
Pautler, A Review of the Economic Basisfor Broad-Based Horizontal-MergerPolicy, 28
ANTITRUST BULL. 571, 633-35 (1983).
33. 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS 26-30 (1975).

34. The traditional discussions of barriers began with Bain. See J. BAIN,
(1956). They continued with the work of Mann.
See Mann, Seller Concentration, Barriersto Entry and Rates of Return in Thirty Industries,
1950-60, 48 REV. ECON. & STAT. 296 (1966). More recently Caves, Gale and
Porter and others popularized the idea of mobility barriers among firms within
an industry, and other researchers have extended the theoretical discussion of
entry barriers to include strategic elements, such as preemptive capacity, capacity expansion or patent accumulation, product proliferation, first-mover advantages and learning-curve effects, to mention a few. See Caves, Gale & Porter,
Interfirm Profitability Differences: Comment, 91 QUART. J. ECON. 676 (1977); see also
Schmalensee, Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry, 9 BELLJ.
ECON. 305 (1978); Spence, The Learning Curve and Competition, 12 BELLJ. ECON.
49 (1981). For a more extensive bibliography, see Paulter, supra note 32, at 63335.
BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION
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entry), which affect the significance of concentration level standard, are discussed: the DOJ's thirteen factors are compared to
the NAAG's four. The final section contains conclusions and
some speculation as to the future of antimerger policy.
II.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The DOJ and NAAG Horizontal Guidelines adopted nearly
identical concentration level standards for mergers subject to section 7 of the Clayton Act. 3 5 Their main differences concern:
1) policy assumptions, 2) market definition methodologies, and
3) factors other than concentration levels which should affect the
decision whether to challenge a merger. With respect to the
DOJ's stated policy assumptions (as opposed to its actions), the
DOJ Guidelines are eclectic and roughly in the mainstream. The
NAAG Guidelines, on the other hand, contain a statement of policies that can only be read as a counter attack on the Chicago
School position that allocative efficiency is the only goal of antitrust policy. The NAAG Guidelines state that allocative efficiency
is subsidiary to the central purpose of section 7 which is to prevent firms from attaining market or monopoly power to prevent a
36
transfer of wealth from consumers to such firms.
With respect to product and geographic market definitions,
the DOJ Guidelines are hypothetical and future oriented. 3 7 They
tend to be biased in favor of broad markets and therefore may
systematically understate market shares used to calculate market
concentration, with the result that fewer mergers will be challenged. Recent merger cases and consent decrees demonstrate
that the hypothetical and speculative market definitions in the
DOJ Guidelines are generally unworkable in the context of litigation. 3 8 On the other hand, the NAAG market definitions, which
use historical data, are similar to those which the courts have traditionally employed. 39 Since the NAAG market definitions rely
on historical data, they may be biased toward narrower markets,
and may tend to overstate market shares used to calculate market
35. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 3; NAAG Guidelines, supra
note 2, § 4.
36. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 2.
37. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 2.
38. For a detailed discussion of this point, see infra notes 67-143 and accompanying text.
39. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3.
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40

concentration.
The analysis of recent merger cases and consent decrees in
this article shows that the DOJ has apparently not been implementing the concentration standard in its own Guidelines. 41 (The
NAAG, which adopted the DOJ's concentration standard, would
presumably adhere more closely to it than the DOJ has.) It will
appear later in this discussion that a major reason for the inconsistency between the DOJ's stated policy and its actions may be
that its Guidelines are based on the incompatible assumptions
and methodologies of two rival schools of economic thought.
The DOJ's actual policy guide may possibly be inferred from a
footnote in its 1982 Guidelines where it stated that "[t]here is
some economic evidence that, where one or two firms dominate a
market, the creation of a strong third firm enhances competition."'4 2 Given the reluctance of the DOJ to challenge mergers, it
has been suggested that the stated threshold level of concentra43
tion at which mergers may be challenged should be raised.
With respect to what factors other than concentration levels
should affect a decision whether to challenge a merger, the DOJ
Guidelines take a flexible approach. When the DOJ revised its
Guidelines in 1984, it increased the number of other factors and
defenses from ten to fourteen. 44 The other factors and defenses
were probably expanded in order to undercut the concentration
level standard and to bring the Guidelines more into conformity
with its lenient enforcement policy. In current form, the DOJ
Guidelines include virtually any economic rationale which would
allow the merged firms to demonstrate that concentration levels
overstate their actual market power. On the other hand, the
NAAG Guidelines, which emphasize the concentration level standard as a true guideline, limit the number of other factors and
defenses that may affect the significance of market share and con45
centration levels to four.

40. For a discussion and empirical verification of this point, see infra text
accompanying notes 67-143.
41. 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1245, at 1056 (Dec. 19,
1985).
42. For a discussion of the concentration standards used to establish a prima
facie case of an antitrust violation, see infra text accompanying notes 144-85.
43. 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1245, at 1056 (Dec. 19,
1985). For a discussion of whether threshold concentration levels should be
raised, see infra notes 144-85 and accompanying text.
44. For a discussion of the Revised DOJ Guidelines, see infra text accompanying notes 186-212.
45. There are three other factors plus a failing firm defense. See NAAG
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AND

NAAG GUIDELINES: A

[Vol. 33: p. 281
COMPARISON

OF POLICIES

In the DOJ Guidelines, "market power" is defined as the ability of one or more firms to maintain prices above competitive
levels profitably for a significant period of time.4 6 Market power
may be achieved either by a single seller (monopolist) or a few
sellers who explicitly or implicitly (tacitly) coordinate their actions
to approximate the performance of a monopolist. 47 With respect
to the policies underlying the DOJ Guidelines, the DOJ states that
mergers which create or enhance market power are undesirable
because the "result is a transfer of wealth from buyers to sellers
and a misallocation of resources." 48 DOJ Guidelines give equal
weight to and do not distinguish between the goals of preventing
wealth transfers and preventing resource misallocation; thus, literally they do not endorse the Chicago School position that the
sole goal of antitrust policy is the efficient allocation of resources.
The DOJ Guidelines also state that "[w]hile challenging competitively harmful mergers, the Department seeks to avoid unnecessary interference with that larger universe of mergers that are
either competitively beneficial or neutral." 4 9 Lastly, the DOJ
states that "the Guidelines reflect congressional intent that
merger enforcement should interdict competitive problems in
their incipiency." 50 The incipiency standard echoes the Supreme
Court's opinion in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.5 ' Thus, on its
face, if not in practice, the DOJ statement of purpose and underlying policy assumptions is squarely in the mainstream.
The NAAG Guidelines, on the other hand, contain a stateGuidelines, supra note 2, §§ 5-6. For a discussion of these factors, see infra notes
186-212 and accompanying text.
46. "Market power" also encompasses the ability of a single buyer or group
of buyers to depress the price paid for a product to a level that is below the
competitive price. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1.

47. See, e.g., United States v. Bethelem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.
N.Y. 1958) (Congress in framing antitrust laws was clearly concerned with "concentration in an oligopoly framework" as an instance of a "trend to create
monopoly.")
48. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1.

49. See id. "The Guidelines are designed primarily to indicate when the Department is likely to challenge mergers, not how it will conduct the litigation of
cases that it decides to bring." Id.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962). The Supreme Court said, "It is apparent that
a keystone in the erection of a barrier to what Congress saw was the rising tide of
economic concentration, was its provision of authority for arresting mergers at a
time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still
in its incipiency." Id.
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ment of policies that can only be read as a counter attack on the
Chicago position that the sole goal of antitrust policy is the efficient allocation of resources. Although neither the Chicago
School nor any of its leading authors are explicitly mentioned, the
NAAG policy statement says that:
The central purpose of [§ 7 of the Clayton Act] is to prevent firms from attaining market or monopoly power,
because firms possessing such power can raise prices to
consumers above competitive levels, thereby effecting a
transfer of wealth from consumers to such firms ...
Such mergers were prohibited even prior to the actual
attainment or exercise of market power, that is, when the
trend to harmful concentration was incipient ....
Other
goals of the law were the prevention of excessive levels
of industrial concentration because of the political and
social effects of concentrated economic power and the
fostering of productive efficiency, organizational diversity, technological innovation and the maintenance of
opportunities for small and regional businesses to compete ....
The Congress evidenced little or no concern
for allocative efficiency when it enacted section 7 and the
other antitrust laws. . . . Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has clearly ruled that any conflict between the goal
of preventing anticompetitive mergers and that of increasing efficiency must be resolved in favor of the former explicit and predominant concern of the
52
Congress.
The Supreme Court decisions on which the NAAG policy statement relies for support are from the 1960s: Brown Shoe v. United
States,5 3 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co. ,54 United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank. 55 In two subsequent cases from the 1970's, United
52. NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 2; see also Lande, Wealth Transfers as the
Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34
HAST. L. REV. 65 (1982); Salop & Krattenmaker, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986). For excellent
summaries of arguments regarding the wisdom of a large number of possible
antitrust goals, see Bork, Blake, Bowman & Jones The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue in Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965); Flynn, AntitrustJurisprudence:A Symposium on the Economic, Politicaland Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV.
1183 (1977). For a history of this debate, see Blake &Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 377-82 (1965).
53. 370 U.S. 294, 315-16 (1962).
54. 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967).
55. 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963).
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States v. General Dynamics Corp. ,56 and United States v. Citizens &
Southern National Bank, 57 the Supreme court refused to equate the
possession of a significant market share with a significant threat to
competition. 58

On the other hand, these two cases have highly

unusual facts that required discounting large market shares 5 9 and

the decisions from the 1960s have not been overruled.
The Chicago School position is further attacked in footnotes
of the NAAG Guidelines, where it is explained that proper legislative function is to make basic policy choices, whether or not those
choices coincide with the beliefs of a particular administration,
enforcement agency, or school of economic theory;60 that in most
mergers creating market power, the effect of the wealth transfer

from consumers will be many times as great quantitatively as the
effect on allocative efficiency; 6 1 that allocative efficiency is an inadequate goal since it can be achieved in an economy with mas-

sive inequalities of income distribution; 62 and that the term of art,
"consumer

welfare," used by Chicago School authors, 63 refers to

56. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
57. 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
58. The cases relied upon by the NAAG for its policy statement were Warren Court cases. However, both GeneralDynamics and Citizens & Southern National
Bank are Burger Court cases. The speculation as to the different approaches
taken by these two courts in the judicial implementation, if you will, of antitrust
policy may illuminate why the NAAG looked to cases like Brown Shoe. Consider
in this context the following thought on the impetus behind the Burger Court's
antitrust decisions. The Burger Court dismantled the Warren Court's "simplified test of illegality" when almost always the government won, and resurrected
"the rule of reason approach" where "nothing short of proof of present anticompetitive effect would be sufficient to meet the 'lessen competition' standard of
section 7." Lurie, Mergers Under the Burger Court: An Anti-Antitrust Bias and It's
Implications, 23 VILL. L. REV. 213, 214 (1978) (emphasis in original).
59. In General Dynamics, the market shares were of current sales (of coal)
made pursuant to long-term contracts entered into a long time ago; future sales
would depend on uncommitted reserves, and one of the acquired firms had no
uncommitted reserves. 417 U.S. 486 (1986). In Citizens & Southern, the acquired
banks were already under the effective control of the acquirer (they were its "de
facto branches"),so that the formal merger had little competitive significance.
442 U.S. 86 (1975); see Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1975 (1987).
60. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 1 n.7 (emphasis added).
61. Harris &Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An IntegratedApproach, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1984). Economists who have attempted to determine the
welfare losses due to monopoly have come up with estimates from as little as
.1% of Gross National Product to as much as 13%. Compare Harberger, Monopoly
and Resource Allocation, 44 AMER. ECON. REV. 77 (1954) with Cowling & Mueller,
The Social Costs of Monopoly Power, 88 ECON.J. 727 (1978). See Pautler, supra note
32, at 576.
62. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 2 n. 15.
63. "The only legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization
of consumer welfare." R. BORK, supra note 9, at 51; accord GAF Corp. v. Eastman
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allocative efficiency and "has nothing to do with the welfare of
consumers."64
IV.

THE PROCESS OF DETERMINING WHETHER A MERGER

CREATES OR ENHANCES MARKET POWER

Since the object of antitrust policy is to challenge mergers
that result in market power, it would be preferable if direct evidence of market power were available. Direct evidence would be
data on the spread between the merging firms' marginal cost and
the prices they charge, or data on their long term profit rates.
However, because the relevant data is either unavailable or severely biased when available, 65 both the DOJ and NAAG Guidelines determine whether a merger will result in market power
indirectly by the following three-step process: (1) the product
and geographic markets of the merging firms are defined; (2) the
level of concentration in the market and its increase is compared
to the standard stated in the Guidelines; and (3) if the postmerger concentration level is less than the lowest concentration
threshold allowed by the standard, a merger will not be challenged by the DOJ 6 6 and is unlikely to be challenged according to
the NAAG Guidelines. 67 If the concentration level exceeds the
standard, other factors (e.g., the level of entry barriers) are
weighed against the absolute concentration level and its increase
in order to determine whether the merger is likely to lessen competition substantially, and therefore whether it should be challenged. 68 The major differences in the DOJ and NAAG
Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203, 1226 (S.D. N.Y. 1981); R. POSNER, supra note 9,
at 3-4; Calvani, supra note 9, at 24-31; see also 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
103-113(c).
note 9,
64. NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 2 n.15.
65. M. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: A PROVISION TEXT 96, 140 (1962); G.
STIGLER, supra note 32, ch.13; McGee, Efficiency and Economies of Size, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 55 (H. Goldschmid, H.M. Mann,
andJ. Weston, eds. 1974).
66. Compare the DOJ's 1982 and 1984 Guidelines: Section III.A. 1.(a) of
the DOJ 1982 Guidelines states that "[tihe Department is unlikely to challenge
mergers falling in this region [post-merger HHI below 1000]." Section 3.11,
1984 DOJ Guidelines states that "[t]he Department will not challenge mergers
falling in this region [post-merger HHI below 1000]." For a further discussion,
see infra text accompanying notes 142-76.
67. Section 4, footnote 32 of the NAAG Guidelines states that "[t]he Attorneys General are unlikely to challenge any merger in an industry with a postmerger HHI of less than 1000." See infra text accompanying notes 142-76.
68. Compare 1984 DOJ Guidelines supra note 16, §§ 3.2-3.5 with NAAG
Guidelines, supra note 2, §§ 5.1-5.3. See infra text accompanying notes 142-83.
This three step process which indirectly measures market power was accepted by
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Guidelines concern market definitions and the number of other
factors that are allowed to affect the significance of concentration
levels. Both sets of guidelines will be compared in the context of
recent antitrust merger cases and consent decrees.
V.

PRODUCT AND GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DEFINITION

The 1982 DOJ Guidelines define markets by postulating a
small but significant and nontransitory price increase for each
product of each merging firm at that firm's location. Market definition is further informed by speculation on the likely responses
of buyers, sellers of the same products, sellers located in other
areas, sellers of substitute products, and sellers with flexible pro69
duction processes which could produce the relevant product. If
competitive responses would cause the price increase to be unprofitable, then the area and group of products are expanded to
include additional products and areas until a price increase would
be profitable. At the point which it would be profitable for a hypothetical monopolist in that area to impose a small but significant and nontransitory increase in price, the monopolist's group
of products and its geographic area are considered to be a market. This concept defines the so-called product and geographic
markets.7 0 In short, the 1982 DOJ Guidelines define a market by
postulating a hypothetical cartel composed of all those firms
within a geographical area that produce the product or products
of the merging firms and then ask whether the cartel could sustain
a hypothetical 5% increase for each product of each merging
firm. If the cartel could not sustain the price increase due to competition from other firms, those other firms are included in the
cartel and so on until such a price increase could be sustained.
The firms in this hypothetical cartel comprise the market.
Although the DOJ stated in its 1984 Revised Guidelines that
"[p]erhaps the single most important contribution of the 1982
Guidelines was the development of a clear, economically sound
the Supreme Court in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963).
69. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 2.

In Brown Shoe Co., the

Supreme Court said that "[t]he outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demands between the product itself and substitutes for it."

370 U.S. 294, 325

(1962).
70. The DOJ product and geographic market definition was published a
year after and seems to have been influenced by Landes & Posner, Market Power
in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981).

See also F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL

MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 60
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framework for defining markets within which to analyze mergers," 7' its market definitions are the most criticized and least successful aspect of the Guidelines. 72 Critics immediately
complained that postulating a rigid five percent increase over the
prevailing price is arbitrary in three ways. First, there is no theoretical justification for choosing exactly five percent. 73 (Why not
three, eight or ten percent?) In its Revised Guidelines, the DOJ
responded to that criticism by stating that it "may at times postulate a price increase that is much larger or smaller than five per74
cent, depending on the nature of the industry involved."
Second, since the DOJ market definition employs prevailing
prices, 7 5 the higher the prices that the merging firms charge relative to marginal cost, the easier it is for distant firms to compete
in the relevant market, and thus, the broader the market definition. 76 Wide markets will include more competitors and make the
merger appear more competitive than it is in actuality and less
likely to be challenged. Thus, DOJ market definitions are theoretically biased in favor of more lenient treatment of mergers in
markets in which existing firms already have market power.
Third, the DOJ market definition is vulnerable to the same
criticism that the Supreme Court's analysis in United States v. E.L
duPont de Nemours & Co. 7 7 (the Cellophane case) is subject to. In
duPont, the Court assumed that products are substitutes just because they exhibit a high cross elasticity of demand 78 at prevailing
prices. 79 In the Cellophane case, there may have been a high
71. See Statement Accompanying Release of Revised Merger Guidelines 1984 DOJ
Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1.
72. The 1982 Guidelines' use of hypothetical firms is inconsistent with
commercial reality. Harris &Jorde, supra note 61, at 465; Ordover & Willig, The
1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines: An Economic Assessment, 71 CALIF. L.
REV. 535, 540 (1983).
73. Ordover & Willig, supra note 72, at 540.
74. See Statement Accompanying Release of Revised Merger Guidelines 1984 DOJ
Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1.
75. Although the 1982 DOJ Guidelines did not define the "price" for which
an increase would be postulated, the 1984 DOJ Guidelines specify "prevailing
prices." See Statement Accompanying Release of Revised Merger Guidelines 1984 DOJ
Guidelines, supra note 16, §§ 1, 2.11.
76. Harris &Jorde, supra note 61, at 483-84.
77. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
78. See D. GREENWALD, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 331 (1982). Cross
elasticity of demand "concerns the relation between the quantities bought of
one commodity as a function of the price of another. The demand for commodity A is a function of the price of commodity B." Id.
79. For example, an increase in the price of lamb, when the price of pork
remains constant, will tend to increase the quantity of pork demanded. E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS,

127 (5th ed. 1985).
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cross elasticity of demand among the several products only because the monopolist of-cellophane was following profit maximizing behavior, i.e., the monopolist may have raised the price of
cellophane until consumers were just willing to shift to substitute
products (e.g.s, wax paper, aluminum foil), which they would
have considered to be inferior to cellophane if all products were
priced at their respective marginal costs. Thus, cellophane and
its substitutes may have been more aptly described as related, but
contained in different economic submarkets. In order to assess
whether products exhibiting a high cross elasticity of demand are
substitutes, one would have to know the relationship between the
prevailing prices and marginal costs.8 0 However, if that information were available, one would have enough information to measure market power directly and could dispense with the indirect
three step process of market definition, concentration level measurement, and evaluation of other factors. Use of the DOJ's market definition is even more impractical than the measurement of
cross elasticity in the Cellophane case because it requires information concerning the measure of cross elasticity where a hypothetical monopolist raised its price by a hypothetical amount. 8 1
The hypothetical nature of the DOJ market definition results
in at least two other serious problems. First, since the DOJ market definition considers all responses to a price increase likely to
occur within a year, it looks to the future and therefore requires
data that in most instances is not available. 2 (For example, it
would require data on the likely reaction of sellers located outside
the current selling area, who could divert supplies to the area but
who have not done so in the past and data on the likely reactions
of sellers capable of switching production to the relevant product
within one year but who have not made such a switch in the
past).83 Second, the hypothetical nature of the DOJ's market definition renders it extremely volatile, fluctuating according to as80. H. PETERSON, BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 71 (2d ed. 1985).
81. Harris &Jorde, supra note 61, at 481.
82. Ordover & Willig, supra note 72, at 541.
83. When the DOJ revised its Guidelines in 1984, the period for determining whether production substitution by other firms is likely to occur in response
to a "small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price was changed
from six months to one year to conform with the time period used to identify
firms that are in the relevant geographic market.
"In determining whether any of these [demand and supply] responses are
probable, the department usually must rely on historical market information as
the best, and sometimes the only, indicator of how the market will function in
the future. It is important to note, however, that the Guidelines are fundamentally concerned with probable future demand or supply responses." This state-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss2/2

16

Cirace: The Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice and
19881

HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES

297

sumptions of how firms outside of the provisional product and
geographic markets will respond to a small but significant and
nontransitory price increase.
The 1982 DOJ market definition employs Chicago School
style, ideal behavioral assumptions: "that buyers and sellers immediately recognize the price increase and believe that it will be
sustained for the foreseeable future."'8 4 Such assumptions, which
ignore information imperfections, opportunistic and strategic behavior, and the risks involved in making a commitment to a selling effort based on a small price increase that may or may not be
transitory, in theory nearly always overstate the bounds of both
product and geographic markets in relation to the result in the
actual marketplace. Critics of the DOJ market definition have
often argued that the DOJ markets would be broader than the
economically relevant markets and would result in a systematic
understatement of market shares used in calculating market level
85
concentration.
In practice, since it is not always possible to control the assumptions ofthose who are asked to speculate on likely response
of other firms to a small price increase, the DOJ markets may as
easily understate as overstate the economically relevant markets.8 6 Two recent merger cases, one in which the government
overstated a geographic market and the other in which it understated the product market will illustrate this point.
The DOJ's market definition was held to be too broad in
United States v. Virginia National Bankshares, Inc.,87 a case that involved a merger of two banking organizations located in a remote
mountainous county in southwestern Virginia. The DOJ alleged
that the two banks were horizontal competitors in the same geographic market despite the facts that the two areas were on opposite sides of a mountain eight miles apart and were cut off from
each other in winter. The DOJ tried to prove its cases by offering
surveys in which bank customers were asked to state their likely
response to a five percent price rise.8 8 The court rejected the
ment is tantamount to an admission that the hypothetical market definition will
often be abandoned in practice. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 2.
84. See 1982 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 15, § IIA n.10.
85. Harris &Jorde, supra note 61, at 465; Schwartz, The New Merger Guidelines: Guide to Governmental Discretion and Private Counseling or Propagandafor Revision of The Antitrust Laws, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 575, 586-87 (1983).
86. Werden, Market Delineation and the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines,
1983 DUKE L.J. 514, 572-73.
87. 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,871, 72,351-53 (W.D. Va. 1982).
88. See Wertheimer, DOJ Tries Out its 5-Percent Geographic Market Test, Legal
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DOJ's survey and concluded that the two banks were in two separate geographic markets; i.e., the DOJ market definition overstated the economically relevant market. In his oral opinion, the
district judge, sitting in Big Stone Gap, Virginia, castigated the
DOJ's economic expert on grounds that the survey results and his
testimony were so contradicted by the facts that he must either
have been ignorant or have taken the case purely for monetary
89
reward.
On the other hand, the DOJ's product market definition was
held to be too narrow in United States v. Calmar, Inc. ,90 a case which
involved a merger between two firms in the dispenser/sprayer industry. On the basis of surveys, in which those interviewed speculated that they were unlikely to shift between "dispensers"
(mechanical pump devices that fit on the top of containers and
dispense liquid in the container by use of finger pressure on the
pump) and "sprayers" (similar mechanical pump devices that
emit a fine spray or droplets of liquid) in response to small but
significant and nontransitory increase in price, the DOJ alleged
that there were two separate product markets, sprayers and dispensers. A district court rejected the DOJ's market definitions on
the ground that they were too narrow and concluded that the relevant product market was the dispenser/sprayer market. 91 With
respect to the survey testimony, the court said:
Of necessity, the government's testimony was anecdotal
in nature-the observations of a few of the many hundreds and perhaps many thousands of users of dispensing devices. 921 The testimony reflected in part the
Times (Washington), Aug. 30, 1982 at 17, col. 1; see also Baker & Blumenthal,
supra note 7, at 347 n.146.
89. 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,871, 72,352 (W.D. Va. 1982).
90. 612 F. Supp. 1298 (D.N.J. 1985) (denying government's motion for
preliminary injunction against proposed acquisition).
91. Id. at 1304-05; see also United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S.
441 (1964) (Supreme Court held illegal merger between second largest manufacturer of metal containers with third largest manufacturer of glass containers).
The Supreme Court reversed a district court which had held that glass and metal
containers constituted separate lines of commerce. Id. at 457.
92. Cf Frank Salz & Sons, Inc. v. Hart Schaffner & Marx, 1985-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH)
66,768, 63,178 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (acquisition of financially troubled
competitor by men's "better quality" tailored suit manufacturer held not to be
in violation of section 7 of Clayton Act due to inadequate proof of market definition). The plaintiff was not able to demonstrate the necessary lack of demandor supply-side substitutability between better quality and other kinds (budget,
moderate, or best) of suits so as to show a distinct market. Id. at 63,719. The
only evidence supporting lack of reasonable interchangeability was the subjective and unsupported opinions of various sales and merchandisingpersonnel, who testified
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inertia of any manufacturer to change its methods or
source of supply. It did not reflect the choice which
would be made by new users of dispensing devices entering the market for the first time, an event which must
93
occur with great frequency.
In effect, the court stated that the DOJ understated the product
market because its survey did not reflect the ideal market behavioral assumptions underlying the DOJ Guidelines.
Finally, consider two cases: in one the court adopted the
market definitions in the DOJ Guidelines; in the other the definitions were rejected. In Federal Trade Commission v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,94 a district court expressed approval of the DOJ
Guidelines. 9 5 The court denied the FTC's preliminary injunction
to block a merger between firms which produce polyvinyl chloride
(PVC).96 In discussing the relevant geographic market the court

tracked the language of the DOJ Guidelines. "A geographic market ...

will be broader than the United States whenever a small

but significant and non-transitory price increase by all domestic
producers would be unprofitable because of sales lost to foreign
suppliers. ' 9 7 The court determined two relevant product marfrom experience that people who bought expensive suits would not buy cheap
suits. Id. at 63,720 (emphasis added). Since price was the sole discriminating
characteristic by which to differentiate the markets, there was no way to analyze
whether an increase in price would affect demand for the suits. Id. Moreover,
there were manufacturers of lower quality suits who were capable of converting
to the better quality market. Id. In Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. The Limited,
Inc., a district court held that neither "moderate-priced women's fashion apparel" nor "special-sized women's apparel" constitute a relevant product market
for section 7 purposes because there is no industry or expert agreement on the
meaning of these terms. 587 F. Supp. 246 (C.D. Cal. 1984). Moreover, the
court said that the proffered product market definition does not adequately address two aspects of competition which must be considered when defining any
product market: demand and supply substitutability. Id. With respect to demand substitutability, if specialty stores in a shopping mall raised their prices,
consumers could shop in a "panoply of other locations". Id. at 68,638. With
respect to supply substitutability, garment manufacturers could easily switch
production at little or no cost from size 7 to size 16 dresses. Id. at 68,638.
93. United States v. Calmar Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (D.N.J. 1985).
94. 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,071 (D.D.C. 1986).
95. Id. "The . . .remedy of divestiture remains a possibility, but on this
record and the Department ofJustice Guidelines the Court expresses doubt that
the mere increase in concentration of domestic production will support such a
result." Id. at 62,509.
96. Id. at 62,512.
97. Id. at 62,512-13. "Without specifically defining a global market, the
Court has concluded that external production and capacity does influence the
domestic price structure, and may well become a more significant factor in the
immediate future." Id. at 62,509. The court said given that a five-year trend in
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kets: suspension PVC resins and dispersion PVC resins rather
than three as alleged by the FTC. The reason involves product
interchangeability on the demand side and the ability of producers of similar products to switch production in the event of
meaningful price increases. The court found substitution among
different PVC resins ("Suspension homopolymer and copolymer
resins are made with virtually the same equipment, with switch
over between the two requiring not much more than the turning
of a valve"), substitution between PVC resins and other plastic
resins, and substitution between PVC end products and end
products made from other materials. 98
The DOJ's market definition was useful in Occidental Petroleum
because it was one of the few real-world cases in which buyers had
considered the difference between a product and its next best
substitutes 99 to be very small even when the products were priced
at marginal cost: there is a high cross elasticity of demand even if
each of product is priced close to marginal cost. In short the DOJ
market definition was useful in this case because there was no cellophane problem, i.e., no issue as to whether related products
were in the.same market or in different economic submarkets. As
an analysis of product and geographic market definitions in the
DOJ's own consent decrees demonstrates, commercially relevant
10 2
submarkets' 0 0 (e.g., vidicon tubes,10 ' drapery hardware,
°
3
etc.I ) are as prevalent as broad textbook markets, 0 4 (e.g., naincreased imports and a substantial excess production capacity domestically and
abroad would disrupt any attempt at collusion by domestic producers, a lessening of competition was highly unlikely. Id. at 62,512-13.
98. Id. "The boundaries of these markets, however, are not rigid due to the
substitution that does occur. In addition to substitution among the different
PVC resins, there is some substitution between PVC resins and other plastic
products made from other materials." Id. at 62,512.
99. In order to avoid the Cellophane problem discussed above, a next best
substitute is one in which there is a high cross elasticity of demand even when
both products are charging prices equal to marginal cost.
100. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 (1962) (relevant geographic market within which to assess effects of acquisition must
" 'correspond to the commercial realities' of the industry and be economically
significant").
101. United States v. General Elec. Co., 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,382
(D.D.C. 1986).
102. United States v. Newell Cos., Inc. 1986-1 Trade Case. (CCH) 66,945
(D. Conn. 1985).
103. Many of the markets involved in the consent decrees are narrow; commercially relevant submarkets as opposed to homogeneous product markets
where the difference between a product and next best substitute is small. Representative examples of narrow markets in the consent decrees are as follows: vidicon tubes, milling paddy rice grown in California, gabions used in river control,
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tional markets for nylon 10 5 and beer' 0 6 ). The markets in thirty
consent decrees entered into by the DOJ from 1981 to 1986 are
analyzed in Appendix 1.
Monfort of Colorado, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc. ,107 is a typical case involving a commercially relevant submarket. In Cargill, both the
district court' 018 and the Tenth Circuit' 0 9 unequivocally rejected
the DOJ Guidelines. The Tenth Circuit stated that:
[Defendant] would have preferred that the district court
use the current Justice Department Merger Guidelines,
• . . both to define relevant markets and to ascertain
whether the acquisition will substantially lessen competition. We agree with the district court's decision not to
rely on these Guidelines ....
The Justice Department's
recent revisions of the 1982 market definition standards,
..only strengthen our conviction that these guidelines
are more useful for setting prosecutorial policy than delineating judicial standards."10
The district court, which determined the relevant input product market to be grain fed cattle, rejected defendants' argument
that non-fed cattle are functionally and reasonably interchangeable with fed cattle. The court held that the market should not
include slaughter facilities for non-fed cattle: first, only grain fed
drapery hardware used to hang drapes, air turbine starters, aviation lighting,
military specification computers, etc. Other consent decrees have broad product
markets but narrow geographic submarkets: e.g., nursing homes in 4 local geographic markets, beer in southeast U.S., dry-mix concrete products in the Washington-Baltimore and Philadelphia-New York City markets, waste collection in
20 localities, etc. See infra Appendices I and II.
104. "Perfect Competition Defined . . . Homogeneity of Product. The
product offered by any seller is identical to that supplied by any other seller....
Because the product is homogeneous, consumers do not care from which firm
they buy." W. J. BAUMOL & A.S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY,
468 (3rd ed. 1985).
105. See e.g., United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 1982-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,479 (D.D.C. 1981).
106. See e.g., United States v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 1983-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 65,399 (D. Del. 1983).
107. 591 F. Supp. 683 (D. Col. 1983), aff'd, 761 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985),
reversed on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 484 (1986) (plaintiff did not have standing).
108. See 591 F. Supp. at 695-96. "We have considered the Merger Guidelines in the process of resolving this case. However, in determining whether the
planned acquisition will violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, the Court has relied
primarily on the judicial standards developed in judicial precedents arising
under section 7." Id. at 695-96.
109. 761 F.2d at 579.
110. Id. (citations omitted).
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cattle yield beef cuts with a consistent quality of USDA "good" or
better.I1 I Second, customers who purchase fed cattle are generally unwilling to buy from slaughterers who deal to any great extent in non-fed cattle. 1 2 Buyers who want better cuts of beef
have apparently determined that avoiding firms which have the
capability of substituting inferior products is more efficient than
engaging in costly inspections." 3 Third, non-fed slaughtering facilities generally lack both fabrication facilities" l 4 and important
economies of scale because they are smaller than facilities used to
slaughter fed cattle. 1 5 Fourth, fed and non-fed cattle slaughtering facilities are located in different parts of the country and do
not compete because of the high transportation and shrinkage
costs from shipping carcasses long distances." 6 Fifth, the overwhelming percentage of cattle slaughtered and fabricated by the
parties themselves was grain fed.'17 Sixth, defendants' internal
reports indicated their belief that fed cattle constitute a separate
product market." 8 With respect to the relevant output market,
the court determined that the relevant product market was vacuum-packed boxed beef. It rejected defendant's arguments for
broadening the output market to include all beef whether sold as
carcass," 19 ground, 20 or boxed beef. With respect to both input
and output product markets the district court said: "In order to
111. 591 F. Supp. at 697.
112. Id. at 698.
113. Whereas in Occidental Petroleum, the prospect of easy substitution in
production increased the likelihood that the relevant products were in the same
market, in Cargill, the prospect of easy substitution of an inferior product in
place of a superior product dictated that the products be sold in separate
markets.
114. " 'Fabrication' is the process whereby the [animal] carcass is broken
down into either whole cuts (referred to as 'primals,' 'subprimals' and 'portions') or ground beef." 591 F. Supp. at 690.
115. Id. at 696, 698.
116. Id. at 699-700.
117. Id. at 697.
118. Id. at 698.
119. Id. at 702. Although the ultimate consumer is probably unable to distinguish between carcass beef and boxed beef, they are not functionally interchangeable to the retail store owners and the hotel and restaurant industry
buyers because of the reduced transportation cost, reduced labor cost and
longer shelf life of boxed beef over carcass beef. Carcass beef sales currently
account for only 16% of fed cattle slaughter. The market share of boxed beef
has risen from zero to 80% in the past 20 years and the trend will apparently
continue. Id.
120. Id. "Although ground beef and boxed beef are, in one sense, interchangeable as food stuffs, the two products are not functionally interchangeable
in several important respects." Id. The hotel and restaurant industry only uses
the better cuts of beef, i.e., boxed beef. Id. Boxed beef and ground beef are
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justify expanding a relevant product market due to interchangeability of production facilities, it is necessary to focus on what man12
ufacturers actually do as opposed to what they could do." '
The NAAG Guidelines, on the other hand, define markets as
courts traditionally have, using hard evidence, that is, historical
data.' 2 2 Thus, where the DOJ market definition standard is hypothetical, speculative and future oriented, 2 3 the NAAG market
24
definition is concrete, practical and past oriented.
In the NAAG Guidelines, the relevant product market includes each product produced in common by the merging firms,
plus comparably priced products that 75% of the customers of
the merged firms consider to be suitable substitutes. 25 The releproducts of different production facilities. Id. Third, there are substantial price
differentials between boxed beef and ground beef. Id.
121. 591 F. Supp. at 697 (emphasis in original); see also FTC v. Coca-Cola
Co., 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,208 at 61,019-20 (D.D.C. 1986). The district court, in discussing the relevant product market, said:
In view of the structure and operation of [the carbonated soft drink]
industry, the relevant line of commerce in evaluating the acquisition is
assuredly not what Coca-Cola Company suggests-"all ... beverages
including tap water"-even though it is true that other beverages
quench thirst and that "[t]he human stomach can consume only a finite
amount of liquid in any given period of time." The market or submarkets delineated need not be this broad (anything potable) nor as
unduly narrow (concentrate flavoring) as lawyers or economists may
choose to suggest.
Id.
122. United States v. Marine Bancorp, 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States
v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321 (1963).
123. In practice as opposed to theory, the differences between the DOJ and
NAAG Guidelines should not be overemphasized. The DOJ Guidelines state:
In determining whether any of these [supply and demand] responses
are probable, the department usually must rely on historical market information as the best, and sometimes the only, indicator of how the
market will function in the future. It is important to note, however, that
the Guidelines are fundamentally concerned with probable future demand or supply responses ....

In most cases, the Department's evalua-

tion of a merger will focus primarily on firms that currently produce
and sell the relevant product. In addition, the Department may include
other firms in the market if their inclusion would more accurately reflect probable supply responses.
See Market Definition and Measurement, 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, §§ 2,
*2.2.
124. Economic theory demonstrates that a firm's geographic market will be
discrete, its shape being a function of: (1) the firm's costs and prices, with lower
costs and prices meaning a larger territory for a firm; (2) the firm's transportation rates; discriminatively low rates that do not increase with the distance
shipped enlarge the territory of a firm. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3;
Fetter, The Economic Law of Market Areas, 39 QUART. J. ECON. 520 (1924).
125. The NAAG Guidelines state that markets are defined from the per-
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vant geographic market area encompasses the production locations from which the customers of the merging parties purchase
75% of their supplies of the relevant product. 126 The 75% figure
is, of course, just as arbitrary as the DOJ's hypothetical 5% price
increase which it used in the 1982 Guidelines. By leaving out as
many as 25% of the suppliers of the merged firm's customers, the
75% figure may understate economically relevant markets and
should be construed flexibly when cases warrant. 127 It is a textbook proposition that demand is more elastic in the long run than
in the short run. 128 That is to say, markets tend to contain more
substitutes in the future. Since the NAAG Guidelines look to the
past to inform market definition, their determination is biased toward a narrower market definition then what may actually be the
economically relevant market. In contrast, the DOJ market definition is biased toward markets broader than the economically relevant ones.' 29 Although the general bias of the NAAG Guidelines
may be to understate markets, it may in fact overstate markets in
cases where the merging firms have market power. If the price
charged by the merging firms is substantially above production
costs, other firms may find it profitable to incur sizable transportation costs in order to ship products into this market. 130 In that
case, geographic markets would be overstated, causing market
share to be understated, with the result that such mergers would
be less likely to be challenged.
spective of those interests § 7 of the Clayton Act was primarily enacted to protect, i.e., the classes of consumers or (suppliers) who may be adversely affected
by an anticompetitive merger ("the protected interest group"). See NAAG
Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3; Harris &Jorde, supra note 61, at 18-20.
126. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, §§ 3.1-3.22. The NAAG geographic market definition is reminiscent of that proposed by Elzinga and
Hogarty. See Elzinga & Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation Revisited: The Case of Coal, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1978); Elzinga & Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation Antimerger Suits, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45, 72-76
(1973) [hereinafter Elzinga & Hogarty, Market Delineation].
127. Elzinga & Hogarty, Market Delineation, supra note 126, at 74-75.

128. W.

BAUMOL

& A.

BLINDER,

supra note 104, at 386.

129. In United States v. General Dynamics Corp., the DOJ charged that the acquisition of a firm by General Dynamics would violate section 7 of the Clayton
Act because the latter's share of the relevant market in coal production would be
10.9% after the merger and the concentration ratios of the leading firms would
also increase. 415 U.S. 486, 499-504 (1974). The Supreme Court held, however, that the district court was justified in finding this evidence to be insufficient
to sustain the Government's case, because the acquired firm's coal was tied up in
long term requirements contracts and the company had very limited coal
reserves. Id. In light of the lack of reserves, the Court thought that past production and sales figures overrated the mergered firm's future market power. Id.
130. H. PETERSON, supra note 80, at 73-74.
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The NAAG Guidelines would also admit evidence on product
and geographic submarkets.' 3' This provision is supported by
leading merger cases, which hold that the main criteria for defining a product or submarket are distinctive end uses, independent
pricing, and customer recognition. Recent cases are in accord. In
Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., the Sixth Circuit held that there
were many geographic markets and submarkets for gasoline in
the United States. 13 2 The district court for the Northern District
of California in United States v. Acorn Engineering Co., held that the
relevant submarket included only vandal-resistant plumbing fixtures not plumbing fixtures in general. 133 Again, the district
court for the Northern District of Illinois in Whithaker Corp. v. Edgar, defined the relevant market to be motor-operated aircraft
valves as opposed to the broader market of remote operated aircraft valves (including motor, pneumatic, hydraulic, solenoid, and
134
manually operated valves).
In order to avoid the Cellophane problem discussed above,
the NAAG Guidelines consider only comparably priced prod131. "Evidence of the commercial reality of such a submarket includes
price discrimination, inelasticity of demand and industry of public recognition of
a distinct submarket." See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3.11. In Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, the United States Supreme Court said that when defining
submarkets, courts should rely on "such practical indicia as industry or public
recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors." 370 U.S. 294,
325 (1962).
132. 530 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). "It seems clear that there are many geographical
markets and submarkets for motor gasoline in the country. The District Court
did not err in analyzing concentration ratios in defining relevant markets by
state rather than limiting its consideration to the nation as a whole." 669 F.2d at
380.
133. 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,197 (N.D. Cal. 1981). The government's position as to the existence of a relevant market encompassing only vandal-resistant plumbing fixtures prevailed because: (1) the fixtures had peculiar
characteristics and uses designed for distinct customers (use of the fixtures in
jails where there is a high risk of vandalism); (2) the submarket for vandal-resistant fixtures was recognized as a separate economic entity within the industry;
and (3) vandal-resistant fixture pricing and price sensitivity were distinct from
those of other plumbing fixtures. Id. at 73,712.
134. 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1982). As an example of an extremely specialized submarket in a section 7 Clayton Act case, consider Grumman Corp. v.
LTV Corp., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,364 (2d Cir. 1981). In Grumman
Corp., the court stated that "[a]s both sides point out, the carrier-based aircraft
market has unusual characteristics. In this country there is only one buyer, the
Defense Department. It decides which companies will be invited to submit bids
for new planes. Bidding competitions occur infrequently and entail enormous
costs." Id. at 74,679.
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ucts.1 35 However, by so attempting to avoid this problem, and
also the problem of intractable cross elasticity disputes, the
NAAG market definitions run the risk of excluding genuine substitutes that are not comparably priced. For example, consumers
may choose a lower-priced product because the additional benefits of the "deluxe" model are "not worth" the higher price. If,
however, the price differential between the "standard" and
deluxe models narrows, at least some consumers may decide that
the extra features of the deluxe model are worth the higher price.
Thus, in order to avoid the Cellophane problem, the NAAG market definition runs the risk of defining markets too narrowly. Nevertheless, the NAAG's rough, but practical, approach to the
Cellophane problem is preferable to the DOJ's theoretical approach which necessitates speculation concerning a number of
3 6
imponderables. 1
Unlike the DOJ Guidelines, which include potential competitors (firms that have not yet supplied the market) as part of the
market definition, the NAAG Guidelines take a very restrictive
view of such competitors in its market definition. Before including competition which is likely to occur within one year of the
merger in the relevant market, the NAAG Guidelines require hard
evidence of probable supply response, the most persuasive proof
of which will be a prior history of supplying the market under
similar circumstances. Thus, for market definition purposes, to
be recognized as potential competition, the potential competitors
must have provided actual competition in the past. This method,
which is tantamount to ignoring potential competition when defining markets, is the one courts have traditionally used. As the
Second Circuit said in United States v. Waste Management, Inc.,
"Although potential competition resulting from easy entry can as
logically be appraised as part of market definition . . . we will
utilize the traditional analysis of defining the market in terms of
3 7
existing competitors."
135. In FTC v. PPG Industries, Inc., the district court held that in addition to
being functionally interchangeable, glass and acrylic transparencies frequently
compete for contracts to supply airframe manufacturers and, therefore, are in
the same market. 628 F. Supp. 881 (D.D.C. 1986).
136. A persistent dilemma of antitrust is that simple rules are proclaimed to
be irrational, whereas rational complex rules are criticized for want of simplicity.
Kauper, The 1982 HorizontalMerger Guidelines: Of Collusion, Efficiency, and Failure,
71 CALIF. L. REV. 497, 500 (1983).
137. 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). For a discussion of
Waste Management, see infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text. In Tenneco,
Inc. v. FTC, an FTC conclusion that the acquisition of the second largest manufacturer of replacement shock absorbers by a diversified firm that manufactured
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With respect to foreign competition, the 1982 DOJ Guidelines stated that the DOJ would be "somewhat more cautious,
both in expanding market boundaries beyond the United States
and in assessing the likely supply response of specific foreign
firms . . . [which] may be subject to additional constraints not
present in the purely domestic context."' 138 However, in its 1984
Guidelines, the DOJ stated that "[t]oday's revisions clarify that, in
general, the Guidelines' standards relating to the definition of
markets and the calculation of market shares will apply equally to
foreign and domestic firms. 139 This change, like all other reviautomotive parts and exhaust systems eliminated actual potential competition in
a highly concentrated market for replacement shock absorbers was not supported by substantial evidence that the acquiring firm had viable options to
make a toehold acquisition or was likely to enter the market de novo in the near
future and was reversed. 689 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1982). The point was made in a
strong dissenting opinion that existing shock absorber manufacturers were
aware that the acquiring firm had publicly demonstrated a strong and growing
interest in entering the industry, that circumstantial evidence is the lifeblood of
antitrust law, that the FTC is not required, as the majority demanded, to introduce "smoking gun" evidence, and that in determining whether the FTC's findings are supported by substantial evidence the court may not substitute its
inferences for those drawn by the FTC, provided its findings are rationally
based. Id. at 358-64 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). In Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. v.
Waste Management, Inc., a corporate takeover target was denied a preliminary injunction against a tender offer for its shares because of an inadequate showing of
likelihood of success on the merits of its section 7, Clayton Act claims. 1982-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,860 (W.D. Wash. 1982). Actual competition between
the firm and its takeover target in an eight-state regional market for hazardous
waste management services appeared improbable in view of transportation
costs. In addition, the firm was not perceived by industry members as a potential entrant.
In Republic of Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, a
bank-merger application that had been denied was returned to the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System for more detailed findings as to
whether the acquiring bank holding company and the to-be acquired commercial bank were actual potential competitors whose combination might violate the
section 7 of the Clayton Act standard incorporated in section 3 of the Bank
Holding Company Act. 649 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1981). Although the Board had
made adequate findings as to the oligopolistic character of the relevant banking
market, it failed to identify explicitly other potential entrants in the market, to
offer a persuasive rationale demonstrating that the acquiring bank holding company would probably have entered the market independently, or to make a reviewable finding on whether the holding company's independent entry would
have resulted in a substantial likelihood of ultimately producing deconcentration
or other significant procompetitive effects. Id. at 1044-47.
138. "For example, changes in exchange rates, tariffs, and general political
conditions may limit the ability of such firms to respond to domestic price increases." 1982 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 15, § IIC.
139. The Guidelines also stated that "no foreign firm will be excluded from
the market solely because its sales in the United States are subject to import
quotas." See Statement Accompanying Release of Revised Merger Guidelines, 1984 DOJ
Guidelines, supra note 16, § 3; see also FTC v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 19861 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,071 (D.D.C. 1986). "Without specifically defining a
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sions in the DOJ Guidelines, resulted in a more lenient attitude
by the DOJ towards horizontal mergers. 4 0 Although the first half
of the 1980's witnessed great foreign penetration into American
markets, the rapid decline of the dollar and the growth of protectionist sentiment make it likely that the 1984 Guidelines' equal
treatment of foreign and domestic competition is too lenient and
may already be outdated:
In the NAAG Guidelines, foreign firms presently supplying
the relevant market are assigned market shares in the same manner as domestic firms, according to their actual current sales in
the relevant market. However, the NAAG Guidelines go on to say
that due to tariffs, quotas, fluctuation in exchange rates, and voluntary quantitative restrictions, foreign firms are inherently a less
reliable check on market power than domestic firms; therefore,
when such restrictions exist, the NAAG Guidelines call for a reduction of market shares based upon historical sales data.' 4 ' The
NAAG Guidelines approach is probably more consonant with current international political reality.
VI.

CONCENTRATION STANDARDS

In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,14 2 the Supreme
Court held that large market shares and high concentration levels
global market, the Court has concluded that external production and capacity
does influence the domestic price structure, and may well become a more significant factor in the immediate future." Occidental, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH), at
62,509. The court said given that a five-year trend in increased imports and a
substantial excess production capacity domestically and abroad would disrupt
any attempt at collusion by domestic producers, a lessening of competition was
highly unlikely. Id. at 62,512-13.
140. The 1984 DOJ Guidelines increased the number of defenses and other
factors that may reduce the significance of concentration levels from 10 to 14;
added a failing division to the failing firm defense; added an efficiency defense,
whereas the 1982 Guidelines indicated that the DOJ would consider efficiency
claims only in "extraordinary cases." In 1984, the Guidelines changed the "fivepercent market definition test to a flexible standard," defined the price for which
an increase would be postulated in the market definition standard as the prevailing price (even if such price is above marginal cost), changed the Post-Merger
HHI below 1000 standard from "the Department is unlikely to challenge mergers in this region" to "the Department will not challenge mergers falling in this
region," changed from a "cautious" approach to applying market definition
standards to foreign competitions to one of applying market definition standards equally to both foreign and domestic firms. Statement Accompanying Release
of Revised Merger Guidelines, 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 3.
141. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3.41.
142. 374 U.S. 321 (1963) "[W]e think that a merger which produces a firm
controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a
significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently
likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence
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will establish a prima facie case of an antitrust violation. Accordingly, unless there are other factors that reduce the significance of
market share and concentration levels, disturbing concentration
levels will lead to the conclusion that a proposed merger is anticompetitive. The DOJ Guidelines employ the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI) as its measure of market concentration. 14 3 The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the
individual market shares of all firms in the market. For example,
for a market consisting of five firms with shares of 30, 20, 20, 15,
and 15% each, the HHI is 2150 (302 + 202 + 202 + 152 + 152 =
2150). For the same market, the traditional four-firm concentration ratio, CR4, which is the sum of the market shares of the top
four firms in the market, is 85% (30% + 20% + 20% + 15% =
85%). Unlike the CR4 traditionally used by the courts, the HHI
takes into account both the relative size of firms in a market (giving proportionately greater weight to the market shares of larger
firms) and the total number of firms in a market. It approaches
zero when a market is served by a large number of firms of relatively equal size, and reaches its maximum of 10,000 when a single supplier exists in the market. The HHI increases both as the
number of firms in the market decreases and as the disparity in
size among those firms increases. 144 Although there has been
considerable discussion as to whether the HHI is superior to the
CR4, 14 5 the correlation between the two measures is very high;
one study has arrived at a correlation coefficient of 0.936.146
The DOJ arbitrarily chose critical HHI thresholds of 1000
and 1800; 14 7 these thresholds correspond roughly to CR4s of
of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects." Id. at 363 (citation omitted).
143. For a discussion of the paternity of the HHI index, see Fox, The New
Merger Guidelines-A Blueprint for Microeconomic Analysis, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 519,
569 (1982).
144. The premise of the HHI is the quality of performance increases as
equality of size of sellers increases. Id. at 571; see also Adelman, Comment on the
'H' Concentration Measure as a Numbers Equivalent, 51 REV. EcON. & STAT. 99
(1969).
145. E. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 136-55 (1968); Calkins, The New
Merger Guidelines and the Herfindahl-HirschmanIndex, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 402 (1983);
Dansby & Willig, Industry Performance Gradient Indexes, 69 AMER. ECON. REV. 249
(1979); Ordover, Sykes & Willig, Herfindahl Concentration, Rivalry, and Mergers, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1857 (1982); Schmalensee, Using the H-Index of Concentration With
Published Data, 5 REV. ECON. & STAT. 186 (1977).
146. F. SCHERER, supra note 70, at 58.
147. Calkins, supra note 145, at 417 & n.1 10 (William Baxter who was Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Division when the 1982 DOJ Guidelines
were issued admits the thresholds are arbitrary).
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50% and 70% respectively.' 48 The thresholds divide the spectrum of market concentration into three regions which the DOJ
characterizes as unconcentrated (HHI below 1000), moderately
concentrated (HHI between 1000 and 1800) and highly concentrated (HHI above 1800). the DOJ Guidelines are as follows:
post-merger HHI below 1000
14 9
the DOJ will not challenge a merger
post-merger HHI between 1000 and 1800
a) the DOJ is unlikely to challenge a merger that increases HHI less than 100 points
b) the DOJ is more likely than not to challenge a
50
merger that increases HHI more than 100 points1
post-merger HHI above 1800
a) the DOJ is unlikely to challenge a merger that increases HHI less than 50 points
b) the DOJ may challenge mergers that increases HHI
between 50 and 100 points depending on other factors
15 1
(discussed below),
148. Those are rough average figures. The CR4 cannot be converted into
any single HHI but rather includes a possible range of HHI levels. For example,
consider two markets with CR4 of 100%. The first is comprised of four firms,
each with a market share of 25%. This yields an HHI of 2500 (252 + 252 + 252
+ 252 = 2500). The second market is comprised of four firms with market
shares of 70%, 10%, 10% and 10%. This yeilds an HHI of 5200 (702 + 102 +
102 + 102 = 5200). One thousand corresponds to a minimum CR4 of 33.5%
and a maximum CR4 of 62%; 1800 corresponds to a minimum CR4 of 44.7%
and a maximum CR4 of 84.5%. Weinstock, Some Little-Known Properties of the
Herfindahl-HirschmanIndex: Problems of Translationand Specification, 29 ANTITRUST
BULL. 705 (1984).
149. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 3.11(a). This is a change
from the 1982 Guidelines which stated that the DOJ "is unlikely to challenge
mergers in this region", i.e., HHI below 1000. See 1982 DOJ Guidelines, supra
note 15, § IIIA(l)(a).
150. The increase in concentration as measured by the HHI can be calculated independently of the overall market concentration by doubling the product
of the market shares of the merging firms. For example, the merger of firms
with shares of 5% and 10% of the market would increase the HHI by 100 (5 x 10
x 2 = 100). The explanation for this technique is as follows: In calculating the
HHI before the merger, the market shares of the merging firms are squared
individually. Thus: (a) 2 + (b)2 . After the merger, the sum of those shares
would be squared. Thus: (a + b)2 , which equals aq + 2ab + b 2. The increase in
the HHI therefore is represented by 2ab. See 1982 DOJ Guidelines, supra note
15, § IIIA.1 n.30.
151. In the 1982 Guidelines, the DOJ said that if post-merger HHI is above
1800 and the merger produces increases in HHI between 50 and 100 points, it
would base its decision on a list of other factors. In the 1984 Guidelines, the
DOJ said that it would be likely to challenge such mergers, "unless" its list of
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c) the DOJ will challenge a merger that increases HHI
more than 100 points except in "extraordinary cases" in
which other factors establish that the merger is not likely
1 52
substantially to lessen competition.
The DOJ Guidelines also contain a "leading firm proviso" to
the effect that a merger between a firm, which has a market share
of at least 35% and is twice as large as the second largest firm in
the market, and a firm with at least a 1% market share is likely to
be challenged. However, the 1984 DOJ Guidelines state that
"market share and concentration data provide only the starting
point for analyzing the competitive impact of a merger. Before
determining to challenge a merger, the Department will consider
all other relevant factors that pertain to its competitive
impact." 153
In practice, the DOJ has not challenged mergers that are
within the HHI 1000-1800 range. As of March, 1987, not one
enforcement action has been instituted against a merger within
the HHI 1000-1800 range in the past seven years.' 54 Given this
permissive approach of the DOJ, former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Sanford Litvak, has described his approach to
counseling clients in merger cases by saying, "there is virtually
nothing not worth trying." 5 5 Another former Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust, J. Paul McGrath, has suggested that given
the reluctance to challenge mergers especially where ease of entry
or efficiency defenses are present, the DOJ should consider raising the threshold challenge to 1800 or 2000.156
The HHI and concentration ratios of the 30 consent decrees
other factors convinced it that the merger would not be likely substantially to
lessen competition. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 3.11 (c). The different formulations in the 1982 and 1984 Guidelines are to the same effect.
152. See id. § 3.11.
153. See id.
154. 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1308, at 605 (March 26,
1987). For example, the General Motors-Toyota joint venture in the subcompact automobile market would increase the HHI from 1293 to 1773, an increase
of 480 points. Weinstock, supra note 148, at 711.
155. 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1245, at 1056 (Dec. 19,
1985).
156. Id. at 1056. In FTC v. Coca-Cola Co., the largest carbonated soft drink
company in the United States attempted to acquire the fourth largest, a merger
that surely no one would have thought worth trying previous to 1980. 1986-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,208 (D.D.C. 1985). In this case, a district court granted
a preliminary injunction against the merger on a showing that the defendant
would enjoy a 42% post-merger share of the market, a 4.2% addition. Id. In the
South and South Western United States, its post-merger share would be over 50%.
Id. The CR4 would was 76.6 and the HHI would increase from 2306 to 2390
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that are analyzed in Appendix I bear out these statements: of the
12 consent decrees for which HHI figures are given in competitive impact statements,1 57 all have at least one relevant market in
which the HHI is substantially above 1800; of the 17 consent decrees, for which concentration ratios are given (but not HHI), all
but one are correspondingly high, having CR4s exceeding 70%.
In one consent decree the competitive impact statement gives
neither HHI nor concentration ratios. The consent decrees also
reflect the DOJ's "fix it first" or curative divestitures approach to
mergers.15 8 Under this approach, rather than limiting its alternatives to either challenging or not challenging a merger, the DOJ is
willing to discuss partial divestitures that would make a merger
acceptable. There are suggestions in at least two cases that the
curative divestiture approach to mergers may be subject to abuse
due to the possibility of sham divestitures. !5 9
An investigation of consent decrees from 1981-1986 supports the following generalizations: four consent decrees involve
(concentration figures calculated from table 1986-2 Trade Cas. at 61,020). Id. at
61,020.
157. "Simultaneously with the filing ... [of any proposal for a consent
judgment submitted by the United States under the antitrust laws], unless otherwise instructed by the court, the United States shall file with the district court,
publish in the Federal Register, and thereafter furnish to any person upon request, a competitive impact statement. ... ." 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1982).
158. N.Y. Times, Sept., 16, 1986, § IV, at 2, col. 1.
159. National Union Elec. Corp. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 64,274 (N.D. Il. 1981). The merger of two competitors in the highly
concentrated chain saw market, was not challenged by the government on condition that one of the merging firms-also a manufacturer of other lines of power
tools-sell, its chain saw business to a third party. Id. at 74,197. The merged
companies' subsequent decision to begin marketing chain saws through the
power tool distribution system, could be viewed as a possibly unlawful horizontal merger only if the sale of the chain saw assets had been a sham transaction.
Id. at 74,198. A third party's charges under section 7 of the Clayton Act were
not dismissed, but a preliminary injunction was denied. Id.
White Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., involved two stock
purchases under which a dishwasher manufacturer would 1) acquire a competitor's dishwasher marketing (including brand names) and manufacturing subsidiaries, and 2) as a curative divestiture would (a) sell the manufacturing subsidiary
to a dishwashing marketer and (b) agree to be supplied from the manufacturing
subsidiary it transfered. 612 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Ohio), vacated, 619 F. Supp.
1022 (N.D. Ohio 1985), aft'd, 781 F.2d 1224 (6th Cir. 1986). The HHI made a
prima facie case (HHI for dishwashers ranging from 1,599 to 2,572 and posttransaction HHIs ranging from 1,844 to 3,832). However, over plaintiff's objections that the supply contract placed the dishwashing marketer to whom the
manufacturing subsidiary was transferred in the position of a subcontractor for
the merged firm, a district court allowed the merger after the parties to the supply contract agreed to an amendment of the contract so as to allow the marketermanufacturer to control its own production and to become an independent
force in the market.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss2/2

32

Cirace: The Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice and

1988]

HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES

313

regional or national firms that competed in many local markets
(nursing homes, 16 0 banks, 16 1 waste collection services, 162 and textile rental services' 6 3). The DOJ ended its challenge to these
mergers when the firms consented to a divestiture of plants in
localities where the merger would result in HHIs substantially in
excess of 1800. One can assume that because of inherent multiplant economies of scale, 16 4 the DOJ did not demand total divestiture in these local market extensions. Two consent decrees
involved national brewers which wanted to strengthen their position in regional markets; these mergers were allowed subject to
divestiture in regions where the HHI would substantially exceed
1800.165 Two consent decrees involved large diversified firms
that when combined would have had a near monopoly in a single
product line which each firm produced. 166 In each case, the
merger was not challenged subject to divestiture of that product
line by one of the diversified firms. The 1981-1986 consent decrees of the DOJ are analyzed in Appendix II.
The natural question to ask is, why has the DOJ enforcement
policy apparently been at odds with the stated thresholds in its
own Guidelines? The answer may be found in the inconsistent
methodology or schizophrenic nature of the DOJ Guidelines. On
the one hand, the DOJ's market definition standards show the influence of the Chicago School: the market definition is theoretically ideal, but in practice, unworkable. 16 7 On the other hand, the
HHI thresholds that divide the spectrum of market concentration
into three regions show the influence of the "Harvard School": 168
the HHI thresholds are theoretically arbitrary, but definite and
160. United States v. Beverly Enter., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,052
(M.D. Ga. 1984).
161. United States v. National Bank and Trust Co. of Norwich, 1984-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,074 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
162. United States v. Waste Management Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (D.D.C. 1985).
163. United States v. ARA Servs., Inc., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,209
(S.D. Ohio 1982).
164. D. DEWEY, THE THEORY OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION: A RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION 42-59 (1969).

165. United States v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 65,399 (D. Del. 1983); United States v. The Stroh Brewery Co., 198283 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,037 (D.D.C. 1982).
166. United States v. General Elec. Co., 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,382
(D.D.C. 1986); United States v. Allied Corp., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,867
(D.D.C. 1985).

167. The DOJ product and geographic market definition was published a
year after and seems to have been influenced by Landes & Posner, supra note 70.
Landes and Judge Posner are two leading Chicago School authors.
168. Posner, supra note 8.
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practical. The tripartite division of the DOJ Guidelines is reminiscent of the tripartite characterization of the spectrum of market concentration suggested by two Harvard School authors, Carl
Kaysen and Donald Turner, albeit with significantly lower thresholds. They characterized industries as either unconcentrated
(CR8 below 33%), Type II [or loose] Oligopoly (CR8 between 33
and 50%), or Type I [tight] Oligopoly (CR8 above 50%, CR20 =
75%). 169
In general, the characterization of the spectrum of market
concentration by a tripartite division is an acceptance of the
Harvard School's structure-conduct-performance paradigm,i70
which states that there is a "causal flow from market structure...
to conduct and performance."' 17' That is, increasing concentration causes noncompetitive conduct and results in poor performance and/or allocative inefficiency. Chicago School authors reject
this paradigm as well as the possibility of determining practical
thresholds. 7 2 For example, consider the testimony of Professor
George Stigler of the University of Chicago in Marathon Oil Co. v.
Mobil Corp.,173 concerning the interpretation of the most important element in market structure, the concentration ratio: "what
level do we worry about? And I must say that we have no precise
point which is a critical point at which you must worry." 174 The
affinity of the Reagan Administration's DOJ for the Chicago
School's antitrust analysis, much of which denigrates the very paradigm on which the concentration thresholds are based, is one
factor that tends to explain why the DOJ has apparently not fol169. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 27 (1959).
170. The elements of market structure are: number of sellers and buyers,
product differentiation, barriers to entry, cost structures, vertical integration,
and conglomerateness; the elements of conduct are: pricing behavior, product
strategy and advertising, research and innovation, plant investment, and legal
tactics; the elements of performance are: production and allocative efficiency,
progress, full employment, and equity. J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 3638, 295-301, 310-15 (1968); F. SCHERER, supra note 70, at 3-6; Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1265
(1949).
171. F. SCHERER, supra note 70, at 5.
172. INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING ch. 4 (H.
Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston, eds., 1974) [hereinafter INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION]; Brozen, The Antitrust Task Force Deconcentration Recommendation, 23 J.
LAw & ECON. 279 (1970); Kauper, supra note 136, at 506 (Since Chicago School
authors argue that there is no correlation between concentration and performance, it follows they would argue that the 1982 Guidelines rest on same faulty
premises.); Paulter, supra note 32, at 605-49.
173. 530 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
174. 669 F.2d at 381.
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lowed its own concentration Guidelines. Another factor may be
some recent and controversial scholarship to the effect that three
large firms may be sufficient for an industry to behave competitively.' 75 In a footnote to its 1982 Guidelines the DOJ acknowledged this scholarship but said it was not presently prepared to
act on it:
There is some economic evidence that, where one or two
firms dominate a market, the creation of a strong third
firm enhances competition. The Department has considered this evidence but is not presently prepared to balance this possible gain against the certainty or
76
substantially increased concentration in the market.1
The DOJ's recent actions indicate that it may now be acting on
this evidence.
The NAAG Guidelines closely track the DOJ Guidelines,
adopting both the HHI measure of concentration and the DOJ's
thresholds of 1000 and 1800. An action to challenge a merger is
likely in the HHI 1000-1800 range for increases of more than 100
points, and is likely when HHI is above 1800 for increases of
more than 50 points. 177 An innovation in the NAAG Guidelines
is an attempt "to objectively factor in the dynamic conditions in
an industry." 78 An action to challenge a merger is likely if the
post-merger HHI is between 1000 and 1800 (above 1800), the
merger increases the HHI by more than 50(25) points, and during the 35 months prior to the proposed merger the HHI has increased by more than 100(50) points. The NAAG Guidelines
contain a leading firm proviso similar to that in the DOJ's Guidelines. There is also a provision that a merger between a firm with
a market share of 20% or more and a new, innovative firm in a
market with a moderate to high or very high concentration will be
challenged. The NAAG Guidelines also state that notwithstanding the HHI thresholds, a merger will not be challenged if other
factors concerning ease of entry, history of collusive or oligopolis175. Kwoka, The Effects of Market Share Distribution on Industry Performance, 61
REV. ECON. & STAT. 101 (1979); Kwoka & Ravenscraft, Collusion, Rivalry, Scale
Economies, and Line of Business Profitability (Washington, D.C.: FTC, Bureau of Economics, 1982); Paulter, supra note 32, at 642-49.
176. See 1982 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 15, § IIIA.l.(c) n.33.
177. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, §§ 4.2-4.3.
178. See id., § 4.1. Support for this provision is found in the Supreme
Court's opinion in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, in which it said "[w]e cannot
avoid the mandate of Congress that tendencies toward concentration in industry
are to be curbed in their incipiency." 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1964).
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tic behavior, or efficiencies "compel the conclusion that the
79
merger is not likely substantially to lessen competition."',
Given the policy statement in the NAAG Guidelines, one can
assume that the drafters of the NAAG Guidelines intend that the
state attorneys general will initiate enforcement actions in the
moderately concentrated region (HHI between 1000 and
1800);180 as pointed out above, the DOJ has not initiated actions
in this range. The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Marathon Oil Co. v.
Mobil Corp.,' 81 in 1981, is an example of an opinion that is closer
in spirit to the NAAG than to the DOJ Guidelines. The court upheld a temporary injunction against a merger of two oil companies because it said that the merger would result in concentration
ratios in relevant markets and submarkets from 10% to 20%,
within the range believed to confer market power and other anticompetitive behavior.
Thus far, the few attempts by state and local governments to
enforce the antitrust laws have met with mixed results. In City of
Pittsburg v. May Department Stores Co. 182 a city, county, and state
brought charges under section 7 of the Clayton Act against the
proposed merger of the area's two dominant department store
chains. In a settlement, the chains were permitted to merge on
condition that one store divest a division within two years. On
the other hand, in State of Californiav. Texaco, Inc. ,183 an FTC consent order settling charges that the merger of oil companies violated section 7 was held to preempt a challenge to the merger by
the State of California under its antitrust and unfair competition
statutes.
VII.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MARKET SHARE
AND CONCENTRATION

In United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,i84 the Supreme
Court said: "statistics concerning market share and concentration, while of great significance, [are] not conclusive indicators of
anticompetitive effects." Other factors may either reduce 8 5 or
179. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 4.3.
180. Cf United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 462 (1964) (it
is important to prevent "even slight increases in concentration").
181. 530 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio), aft'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
182. 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,304 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
183. 193 Cal. App. 3d 8, 219 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1985).
184. 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974).
185. In Stroh Brewery Co. v. Malmgren, a district court declined to prelimina-
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strengthen 8 6 the significance of market share and concentration
levels. The DOJ and NAAG Guidelines take opposite approaches
with respect to other factors that affect the significance of market
share and concentration levels. The DOJ Guidelines take a flexible approach and consider a potpouri of other factors in addition
to the HHI and the size of its increase:' 8 7 e.g., ease of entry within
rily enjoin a merger between the third and seventh largest brewers in the United
States (with 7.9% and 5% of the United States market, respectively) on the
grounds that although the acquired company had made a prima facie showing
through statistical data that its acquisition by a competitor would violate section
7 of the Clayton Act by increasing market concentration, it was rebutted by
other factors which showed that competition would not be lessened by the proposed merger and may in fact be increased. 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,670,
73,641 (W.D. Wis. 1982). Factors considered by the court included geographic
sales patterns, different brands and grades of beer, excess plant capacity, economics of scale, national advertising and product differentiation, the inability to
fix prices, and industry structure and history. Id. at 73,643. This merger was
also involved in a consent decree. See United States v. Stroh Brewery Co., 198283 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,037 (D.D.C. 1982). See infra Appendices I & II.
186. FTC v. Bass Bros. Enterprises, Inc., is an example of a merger case in
which other factors strengthened rather than reduced the significance of high
concentration levels and high HHI. 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,041 (N.D.
Ohio 1984). The FTC attacked two mergers in the carbon black industry. The
two mergers would have reduced the number of firms in the industry from 7 to
5; the CR4 would increase from 75% to 89%, the HHI would increase from
1802 to 2320 or 518 points. Each merger alone would have increased the HHI
by 200-300 points. Id. at 66,610. Carbon black is used in reinforcement to give
rubber strength and durability. It is a unique substance for which there are no
practical substitutes. Carbon black is a homogeneous, fungible product (thus,
consensus on a coordinated price structure is easy to achieve). It requires specialized technology and equipment to produce. Demand is highly price-inelastic. Imports are insignificant because carbon black cannot easily be transported
over water since it is hydroscopic and absorbs water. There are no signs of imminent technological change. There is an industry-wide custom of freight equalization and strong pattern of price leadership. There have been no new entrants
for decades and major integrated petroleum companies have exited or are trying
to exit the industry. Finally, in 1984, there was high capacity utilization with
spot shortages and large price increases.
187. See White Consol. Indus. v. Whirlpool Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D.
Ohio), vacated, 619 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 781 F.2d 1224 (6th Cir.
1986). The court said:
The statistics simply require the Court to look further in examining the
proposed transaction to determine whether or not it is, in fact, anticompetitive. While the statistics may appear compelling, the Court considers them to be simply a warning system which alerts regulators that
there may be competitive problems with the proposed transaction.
When concentrations are high and HHIs change significantly because
of a transaction, those charged with maintaining competitive markets
are put on notice that there may be a problem.
To rely exclusively on statistics would be to confine the Court's
inquiry beyond reason, especially in a case such as this where markets
are highly concentrated to begin with. The plaintiffs' argument that
statistics alone should be sufficient to block this transaction virtually
necessitates the conclusion that any acquisitions by any of the major
firms in this industry are anti-competitive and illegal, regardless of the
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two years of the merger, homogeneity-heterogeneity of the relevant product generally, conduct of firms in the market, etc. In
1984, the revised DOJ Guidelines expanded the number of other
factors and defenses from 10 to 14,188 allowed an efficiency defense 18 9 where the 1982 DOJ Guidelines had not, 190 and for the
first time, included a failing division as well as the failing firm defense. 19 1 In short, the revised DOJ Guidelines consider virtually
any economic rationale that would demonstrate that concentration levels overstate the merged firms' actual power. 19 2 As a result of the 1984 revisions, the DOJ Guidelines are more lenient
93
and provide many more opportunities for defense.
United States v. Waste Management, Inc. 194 is an extreme example of other factors outweighing high concentration levels. In
facts surrounding such an acquisition. The Court considers that view
to be extreme and inconsistent with the letter and the spirit of the Department of Justice's merger guidelines.
612 F. Supp. at 1021.
188. Changing Market Conditions (added in 1984), Financial Condition of
Firms in the Relevant Market (added in 1984), Special Factors Affecting Foreign
Firms (added in 1984), Ease of Entry, Homogeneity-Heterogeneity of the Relevant Product Generally, Degree of Difference Between the Products and Locations in the Market and the Next-Best Substitutes, Similarities and Differences in
the Products and Locations of the Merging Firms, Information About Specific
Transactions and Buyer Market Characteristics, Ability of Small or Fringe Sellers to Increase Sales (added in 1984), Conduct of Firms in the Market, Market
Performance, Efficiencies, Failing Firm Defense, Failing Division Defense (added
in 1984). Compare 1982 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 15, § III B-C with id., §§ 3.23.5.
189. In the 1984 Guidelines, the DOJ stated that "the Department will consider ...efficiencies in deciding whether to challenge the merger. See 1984 DOJ
Guidelines, supra note 16, § 3.5; see also Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7
of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE. W. RES. L. REv. 381 (1980); Williamson, Economies as
an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (1977); Williamson, Economies
as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 68 AMER. EcON. REV. 18 (March
1968), with a correction in 69 AMER. ECON. REV. 954 (1969).
190. The 1982 Guidelines indicated that the DOJ would consider efficiency
claims only in "extraordinary cases". See 1982 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 15,
§ V.A; see also FTC v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp. 528 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. I11.
1981)
(failing company defense applied even though acquired business was division of
larger corporation that was successful in other areas).
191. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, §§ 5.1-5.2.
192. The 1982 DOJ Guidelines are not simple rules but read like a chapter
in an industrial organization text; i.e., they leave a wide range of discretion.
Kauper, supra note 136, at 508; see Bronstein, A Review of the Revised Merger Guidelines, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 613, 614 (1984). The 1984 Guidelines cause the DOJ
to act like a regulatory agency. But see Clanton, Focusing the Inquiry: Specificity in
Merger Guidelines and Elsewhere, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 430, 431 (1983) (common criticism of 1982 DOJ Guidelines, that it considers too many factors and is therefore
too vague and general, is mistaken).
193. Miller, supra note 16.
194. 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss2/2

38

Cirace: The Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice and
1988]

HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES

319

Waste Management, the Second Circuit held that although the
merged firm's market share in the Dallas trash collection and disposal market was 48.8% (CR4 increased from 68.1% to 75.2%,
and HHI increased from 1493 to 2676195), this market share did
not accurately reflect future market power in view of the ease of
entry by potential competitors into the Dallas market.' 96 It did
not accept the government's claims that economies of scale outweigh ease of entry or that consumers may prefer Waste Management's services, even at a higher price, over those of a new
entrant because of its "proven track record."' 9 7 Although the
court acknowledged that there is no persuasive authority for allowing low entry barriers and potential competition to overcome
a strong primafacie showing of high concentration, 98 it said that
the United States Supreme Court has held that appraisal of the
impact of a proposed merger upon competition must take into
account potential competition from firms not presently active in
the relevant product and geographic markets.1 99 The Court then
used the DOJ Guidelines as an estoppel against the government:
Finally, the Merger Guidelines issued by the government itself not only recognize the economic principle that ease
of entry is relevant to appraising the impact upon competition of a merger but also state that it may override all
other factors 20 0 . ....
If the Department of Justice routinely considers ease of entry as relevant to determining
195. 588 F. Supp. 498 (S.D. N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984).
196. 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984). The court found that
(1) It is so easy to enter the trash collection market that the relative
competitive strength of a company cannot properly be measured solely
with respect to the existing companies in the market, but must also take
into account potential new entrants. (2) Over the past several years
there has been a trend toward deconcentration, involving steady entry
into the market by new companies....
[The District Court] specifically found that individuals operating
out of their homes can acquire trucks and some containers and compete successfully 'with any other company.'
Id. at 981-82, 983; cf. United States v. Calmar Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1298 (D.NJ.
1985) (district court refused preliminary injunction against proposed acquisition
in dispenser/sprayer industry on grounds that potential entry would prevent unjustified price increases by merged companies).
197. 612 F. Supp. at 1303.
198. Id. (quoting United States v. Waste Management, Inc. 588 F. Supp.
498 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984)).
199. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 531-38 (1973);
FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Penn-Olin
Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
200. "Ease of Entry If entry into a market is so easy that existing competitors
could not succeed in raising price for any significant period of time, the Depart-
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the competitive impact of a merger, it may not argue to a
court addressing the same issue that ease of entry is
20 1
irrelevant.
The NAAG Guidelines place primary reliance on the HHI
and the size of its increase, that is, they emphasize market structure at the expense of other factors that may affect the significance of market shares and concentration levels. Support for this
general approach is found in United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank, 20 2 in which the Supreme Court held that large market
shares are a convenient proxy for appraising the danger of monopoly power resulting from a horizontal merger. 20 3 Where the
DOJ Guidelines opted for flexibility at the cost of predictability,
the NAAG Guidelines stressed the policy objective of maintaining
a decentralized economy by limiting the other factors that affect
the significance of market share and concentration levels to four:
ease of entry within one year of the merger 20 4 (as opposed to the
DOJ's two year period), a history of collusion or oligopolistic behavior, 20 5 a failing firm defense,2 0 6 but not a failing division dement is unlikely to challenge mergers in that market." See 1984 DOJ Guidelines,
supra note 16, § 3.3.
201. United States v. Waste Management, Inc. 588 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), rev'd, 743 F.2d 976, 982-83 (2d Cir. 1984).
202. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). Note the court stated the following:
We are clear, however, that a merger the effect of which "may be substantially to lessen competition" is not saved because, on some ultimate
reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed
beneficial. A value choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary
limits of judicial competence, and in any event has been made for us
already, by Congress when it enacted the amended § 7. Congress determined to preserve our traditionally competitive economy. It therefore proscribed anticompetitive mergers, the benign and the malignant
alike, fully aware, we must assume that some price might have to be
paid.
Id. at 371.
203. Under its rationale, a merger resulting in a larger market share is presumptively illegal, rebuttable only by a demonstration that the merger will not
have anticompetitive effects. Id.at 362-63.
204. In Laidlaw Acquisition Corp. v. Mayflower Group, Inc., the nation's second
largest private contractor for busing of school children was granted a preliminary injunction against its largest competitor's hostile takeover offer. 636 F.
Supp. 1513 (S.D. Ind. 1986). In view of the combined market share of the companies, which would have reached 85.9% in the Pacific Northwest, the acquisition would have produced a firm controlling an undue share of the relevant
markets. Significant barriers to new entry existed in the form of skyrocketing
insurance costs, three-to-five-year contracts, high capitalization costs, performance bond and experience requirements, and other bid specification
requirements.
205. See, e.g, Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1975 (1987). The Seventh Circuit held that substantial
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fense because the drafters believed that the latter is "highly
susceptible to manipulation and abuse," 20 7 and an efficiency defense that is restricted to situations with a post-merger HHI of
less than 1800. Support for restricting an efficiency defense is
found in Federal Trade Commission v. Proctor & Gamble Co. 208 Moreover, studies have found efficiency from economies of scale do
not increase once a firm has a market share above 14%,209 and
therefore, it is likely that this restriction economizes judicial resources and inflicts no costs on merging firms.
VIII.

CONCLUSIONS

The DOJ and NAAG Horizontal Guidelines adopted nearly
identical concentration level standards concerning mergers subject to § 7 of the Clayton Act.2 10 The main differences concern:
(1) policy assumptions, (2) market definition methodologies and
(3) what factors other than concentration levels should affect the
decision whether to challenge a merger. With respect to policy
assumptions, the stated policy of the DOJ Guidelines is eclectic,
giving equal weight to several goals: first to prevent increases in
market power, because firms possessing such power can raise
prices to consumers above competitive levels, thereby effecting a
evidence supported an FTC finding that the acquisition of two competing hospitals and management contracts for two more competitors by the largest proprietary hospital chain in the United States constituted a violation of section 7 of the
Clayton Act. The acquisitions reduced the number of competing hospitals in the
Chattanooga, Tennessee, market from II to 7; the merger made defendant the
second largest provider of hospital services in a highly concentrated market,
CR4 increased from 79% to 91%; Tennessee's certificate-of-need law restricted
entry. The FTC's decision was also supported by the inelastic demand for hospital services and the tradition of cooperation among competing hospitals in
Chattanooga. See also Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 371 (6th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). One of the reasons the Sixth Circuit
gave for upholding a preliminary injunction against a merger of two oil companies was that the existence of many joint arrangements and operations among
members of the oil industry already may have provided opportunity for collusion on price and output. This merger, if allowed, would enhance such possibilities of collusion.
206. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507 (1974);
United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971).
207. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 6.
208. 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967). ("Possible economies cannot be used as a
defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen competition may also result in economies, but it struck the balance in favor of protecting competition.").
.209. F. SCHERER, supra note 70, at 91-98; see also Paulter, supra note 32, at
611-15; INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION:, supra note 172, ch.2.
210. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 3; NAAG Guidelines, supra
note 2, § 4.
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"transfer of wealth from buyers to sellers and a misallocation of
resources"; second "to avoid unnecessary interference with that
larger universe of mergers that are either beneficial or neutral";
and finally, to "interdict competitive problems in their
21
incipiency." 1
The NAAG Guidelines, on the other hand, contain a statement of policies which can only be read as a counterattack on the
Chicago School position that allocative efficiency is the only goal
of antitrust policy. The NAAG Guidelines state that allocative efficiency is subsidiary to the central purpose of section 7 which is
to prevent firms from attaining market or monopoly power in order to prevent a transfer of wealth from consumers to such firms.
Such mergers are to be prohibited when the trend to harmful
concentration is incipient. Another goal is the prevention of excessive levels of industrial concentration because of the detrimen212
tal political and social effects of concentrated economic power.
With respect to product and geographic market definitions,
21 3
the DOJ Guidelines are hypothetical and future oriented.
They tend to be biased in favor of broad markets and therefore
may systematically understate market shares used to calculate
market concentration, with the result that fewer mergers are challenged. Recent merger cases and consent decrees were used to
demonstrate that the hypothetical and speculative market definitions of the DOJ guidelines are generally unworkable in the context of litigation. 21 4 On the other hand, the NAAG market
definitions, which use historical data, are similar to those the
courts have traditionally employed. 2 15 Since the NAAG market
definitions are past oriented, they may be biased toward narrow
markets, and therefore may overstate market shares used to calcu21 6
late market concentration.
An analysis of recent merger cases and consent decrees
demonstrated that the DOJ has apparently not been implementing the concentration standard in its own Guidelines. 21 7 (The
211. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 1.
212. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 2.
213. See 1984 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 16, § 2.
214. For a discussion of the market definitions in the DOJ Guidelines, see
supra text accompanying notes 67-143.
215. See NAAG Guidelines, supra note 2, § 3. For a further discussion, see
supra text accompanying notes 67-143.
216. For a discussion of these definitions, see supra text accompanying
notes 67-143.
217. 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1245 at 1056 (Dec. 19,
1985). See also supra text accompanying notes 144-85.
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NAAG, which adopted the DOJ's concentration standard, would
presumably adhere more closely to it than the DOJ has.) The major reason for the inconsistency between the DOJ's stated policy
and its actions may be that its Guidelines are based on the incompatible assumptions and methodologies of two rival schools of
economic thought. The DOJ's market definition standard shows
the influence of the Chicago School: it is theoretically ideal, but
in practice, generally unworkable. The concentration level standard shows the influence of the Harvard School: it is definite and
practical, but its precise critical values are arbitrary. Chicago
School adherents, who tend toward advocating a laissez-faire approach to mergers, view concentration level standards with disdain; they maintain that no demonstrable relation exists between
concentration and market power. 2 18 In practice, as demonstrated
21 9
by its consent decrees and the merger cases it has prosecuted,
the DOJ has leaned toward the Chicago School view of mergers
and has tended not to enforce its own concentration standard.
The DOJ's actual policy guide may possibly be inferred from a
footnote in its 1982 Guidelines where it stated that "[t]here is
some economic evidence that, where one or two firms dominate a
market, the creation of a strong third firm enhances competition." 220 Given the reluctance of the DOJ to challenge mergers, it
has been suggested that the threshold level of concentration at
221
which mergers will be challenged should be raised.
With respect to the question of what factors other than concentration levels should affect a governmental agency's decision
whether to challenge a merger, the DOJ Guidelines take a flexible
approach. When the DOJ revised its Guidelines in 1984, it increased the number of other factors and defenses from ten to
fourteen. 222 The other factors and defenses were probably expanded in order to both undercut its concentration standard and
bring the Guidelines more in conformity to the DOJ's lenient enforcement policy. In current form, the DOJ Guidelines include
virtually any economic rationale that would allow the merged
218. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd,
669 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1981) rev'don other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 484 (1987).
219. For a discussion of the DOJ's adoption of the Chicago School view of
mergers, see supra text accompanying notes 167-76.
220. See 1982 DOJ Guidelines, supra note 15, § III.A.l.(c) n.33.
221. 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1245 at 1056 (Dec. 19,
1985). For a further discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 144-85.
222. For a discussion of sections III.B-C of the 1982 DOJ Guidelines as
compared to sections 3.2-3.5 of the 1984 DOJ Guidelines, see supra text accompanying notes 186-212.
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firms to demonstrate that concentration levels overstate their actual market power. On the other hand, the NAAG Guidelines,
which emphasize the concentration level standard as a true guideline, limit the number of other factors and defenses that may affect the significance of market shares and concentration levels to
four.

22 3

At the beginning of this article it was noted that antimerger
law has come full cycle from Justice Stewart's dissenting remark in
Von's Grocery that "the Government always wins," to FTC Commissioner Bailey's dissenting remark in Echlin that "according to
the 'new' economic learning, a merger is almost always legal." It
remains to be seen whether recent events such as the wave of
mergers which seem to be based on considerations of financial
manipulation rather than productivity, the deterioration of the
American balance of international trade and protectionist sentiment in Congress (which will enhance the market power of domestic firms), and the secular decline in productivity in the United
States presage the need for a new activist phase in the interpretation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. If so, the issuance of the
NAAG Guidelines may well be remembered as heralding the beginning of a new phase in the cycle.
223. There are three other factors plus a failing firm defense. See NAAG
Guidelines, supra note 2, § 5-6. For a discussion of these factors, see supra text
accompanying notes 187-93.
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APPENDIX I
CONCENTRATION RATIOS AND HHI IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S' CONSENT DECREES,
1981-1986
2

MERGING FIRMS

MARKET

3

CONCENTRATION
RATIO4

HHI
From-To, Increase

1986General Electric;
RCA 6

vidicon tubes

CR2 = 90%

7740-9852, +2116

Rice Growers Ass'n
of Cal; Pacific
7
Intern'l Rice Mills

milling paddy rice
grown in California

CR2 = 63%
CR4 = 95%

3276-4874, + 1598

SpA. Officine
Maccaffini; Terr
8
Aqua

gabions used in
river control

CR2 = 99%

Baxter Travenol
Laboratories;
American Hospital
Supply 9

parenteral solutions,
fluid administration
sets, flow control
devices, therapeutic
hemapheresis
equipment,
surgeons gloves

CR3
CR3
CR3
CR3
CR6

= 95%

=
=
=
=

90%
91%
85%
90%

3648-5330,
3037-4408,
1919-2319,
2700-4000,
1667-2375,

+ 1682
+1098
+ 402
+ 1300
+ 708

1985
Newell Co.; Stanley
Drapery Hardware
Division

drapery hardware
used to hang drapes

CR4 = 78%
CR6 = 95%

3238-2448, +790

Calmar; Realex
Corp."

sprayer, dispensers,
sprayer, dispenser
and triggers

CR2 = 83%
CR2 = 79%
CR2 = 49%

4400-7100, +2700
4000-6400, +2400
2300-3000, + 700

Allied Corp.; Signal
Corp.

airturbine starters

CR4 = 90%

3335-5310, + 1975

Cooper Industries;
division of
Westinghouse
Electric Corp.'"

aviation lighting

CR4 = 72%
CR8 = 87%

3107-3863, + 756

Waste Management;
4
SCA Services'

solid waste
collection and
disposal in 20 local
areas, hazardous
waste offsite
treatment and
disposal

> 1000
>2000
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Alcan Aluminum
Ltd; Atlantic
Richfield Co.' 5

aluminum can body
stock

CR4 = 88%

IBM Corp.
Rolm Corp."

mil-spec (military
specification)
computers

CR2 = 80%

[Vol. 33: p. 281
2300

1984
Nat'l Bank and
Trust Co. of
Norwich; Nat'l Bank
of Oxford 7

retail and
commercial banking
services in northern
3/4 of Chenango
County, NY

CR2 = 80%

Tribune and
Sentinel Star Co.; 3
weekly newspapers
and 2 "shoppers"
owned by Luzadder
Publications"

local print
advertising Osceola
County, Fla. local
advertising Osceola
County, Fla.

CR2 = 100%
CR2 = 60%

LTV Corp.;Jones &
Laughlin Steel"

hot rolled sheets
and strip steel, cold
rolled sheets and
strip steel, stainless
cold rolled sheets
and strip steel

CR2 = 21%
CR2 = 22%
CR2 = 47%

American MaizeProducts Co.; Bayuk
Cigars0

cigars by unit
volume
cigars by dollar
volume

CR4
CR8
CR4
CR8

Beverly Enterprises
(780 nursing
homes); Southern
2
Medical Services '

nursing homes in 4
local geographic
markets

=
=
=
=

871-1047, +176
953-1146, + 193
2190-2898, +708

77%
88%
67%
80%

post-merger share = 73%
29% to 48% in each market

1983
American Brand;
Ofrex Group, Ltd .2

home and office
staplers

British Columbia
Forest Products,
Ltd.; Blandin Paper
Co.23

Coated groundwood
paper in US (used
in magazinescatalogues)

CR5 = 56%
CR8 = 84%

G.Heileman
Brewing Co.; Pabst
Brewing Co.,
Olympia
Brewing
24
Co.

beer in U.S. market

CR4 = 83%

1764-1927, +

163

CR4 = 92%

2345-2531, +

186

post-merger share = 73%
CR4 = 89%

1982
Stroh Brewery Co.;
Jos.25Schlitz Brewing
Co.

beer in southeast,
U.S.
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textile rental
services in
Cleveland-AkronLorain, Ohio area,
Columbus, Ohio
area southwest
Virginia-east
Kentucky area

CR4 = 59%
CR4 = 60%
CR4 = 68%

Baldwin-United
Corp.; MGIC
Investment Corp.2 7

private mortgage
guarantee insurance

CR4 = 73%
CR8 = 96%

Beatrice Foods Co.;
Fiberite Corp. 21

custom
compounded
reinforced
thermoplastic,
custom
compounded
reinforced
thermosets

CR4 = 89%

Acorn Engineering
Corp.; Aluminum
Plumbing
Fixture
2
Corp. )

vandal-resistant
plumbing fixtures

CR2 = 100%

Hospital Affiliates
International;
American Health
Services, Inc.30

inpatient psychiatric
care provided by
psychiatric hospitals
and acute care
hospitals not owned
by State of
Louisiana;
submarket of private
psychiatric inpatient
care in all of New
Orleans

-

(Beatrice 50%)
(Fiberlite 50%)

1981
Columbia
Broadcasting
System; Fawcett
3
Publications '

mass market
paperback
publishing

CR4 = 53%
CR8 = 81%

Harvey Hubbell;
Ohio Brass7 2

underground power
distribution
equipment utilized
in coal mining

CR4 = 70%
CR8 = 89%

E.I.duPont de
Nemours & Co.;
Conoco"

nylon
acrylic fibers

CR4 = 88%
CR2 = 76%,
CR4 = 88%

The Flintkote Co.;
Home-Crete
Division of Corsen "

dry-mixed concrete
products Wash.Bait. market Phila.NY market

CR2 = 47%
CR2 = 72%
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CR2 = 47%
CR4 = 100%
CR2 = 40%

Federal Trade Commission Consent Decree
Texaco, Inc.;
31
Getty Oil Co. !

(1) manufacture and
transportation of
refined light oil
products;
(2) wholesale
distribution of oil
and gasoline in
northeastern U.S.;"
(3) pipeline
transportation
Colorado;
(4) sale, pipeline
transportation, and
refining of heavy
crude oil in
California"

HHI-634 of HHIon
3011, depending
7
assumptions3
Providence, R.I.,
HHI-1936
Portland, Me., HHI1463
NY City, HHI-2658
HHI-1202 or HHI2429 depending on
1
assumptions HHI1206

Because of its importance in terms of size, the consent decree between the Federal
Trade Commission and Texaco is included at the end of this appendix.
'The first firm is the acquiring firm, the second firm or firms are the acquired firms.
Unless otherwise indicated, the geographic market is nationwide.
Concentration ratios are what the post-merger ratios would be if the merger was allowed
without modification.
, The year is the year the consent decree was approved by the courts. Consent decrees
approved in 1981 or later are considered as part of the Reagan Adminstration's record
even if they were begun under the Carter Administration since the current administration
can always drop litigation of which it does not approve.
United States v. General Elec. Co., 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,382 (D.D.C. 1986), 51
Fed. Reg. 25754 (1986).
7 United States v. Rice Growers Ass'n of Cal., 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
67,288 (E.D.
Cal. 1986).
United States v. S.p.A. Officine Maccaferri, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,168 (D. Md.
1986), 51 Fed. Reg. 8039 (March 7, 1986).
" United States v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 1986-I Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,068
(N.D. I11.1986), 50 Fed. Reg. 50857 (Dec. 12, 1985).
"' United States v. Newell Co., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,945 (D. Conn. 1985), 50
Fed. Reg. 14175 (April 10, 1985).
" United States v. Calmar, Inc., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,078 (D. N.J. 1985), 50
Fed. Reg. 27068 (July 1, 1985).
12 United States v. Allied Corp., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,867 (D.D.C. 1985), 50
Fed. Reg. 34019 (Aug. 24, 1985).
" United States v. Cooper Indus., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,688 (D.D.C. 1985), 50
Fed. Reg. 11019 (Mar. 19, 1985).
" United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,652 (D.D.C.
1985), 49 Fed. Reg. 40679 (Oct. 17, 1984).
'5 United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Ltd., 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,427 (W.D. Ky.
1985), 49 Fed. Reg. 40454 (Oct. 16, 1984).
United States v. IBM Corp., 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,439 (D.D.C. 1985), 49 Fed.
Reg. 47122 (Nov. 30, 1984).
" United States v. National Bank and Trust Co. of Norwich, 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,074 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), 49 Fed. Reg. 9630 (March 14, 1984).
66,075
' United States v. Tribune Co. and Sentinel Star Co., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
(M.D. Fla. 1984), 49 Fed. Reg. 5399 (Feb. 13, 1984).
"' United States v. LTV Corp., 1984-2 Trade Cas. 66,133 (D.D.C. 1984), 49 Fed. Reg.
13603 (April 5, 1984).
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United States v. American Maize-Prods. Co., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)

Fla. 1983), 47 Fed. Reg. 8423 (Feb. 26, 1982).
2) United States v. Beverly Enters., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)

66,033 (M.D.

66,052 (M.D. Ga. 1984),

49 Fed. Reg. 9635 (March 14, 1984).
22 United States v. American Brands, Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,276 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), 47 Fed. Reg. 45991 (Oct. 14, 1982).
2
United States v. British Columbia Forest Prods., Ltd., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,280 (D. Min. 1983), 47 Fed. Reg. 57364 (Dec. 23, 1982).
24 United States v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) $ 65,399 (D.
Del. 1983), 47 Fed. Reg. 56064 (Dec. 14, 1982).
21 United States v. Stroh Brewery Co., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,037 (D.D.C. 1982),
47 Fed. Reg. 18,445 (April 29, 1982).
26 United States v. ARA Servs., Inc., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,209 (S.D. Ohio
1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 27164 (June 23, 1982).
27 United States v. Baldwin-United Corp, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,788 (S.D. Ohio
1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 9591.
2
United States v. Beatrice Foods Co., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,698 (D. Minn.
1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 4622 (Feb. 1, 1982).
219 United States v. Acorn Eng'g Co., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,697 (N.D. Cal. 1982),
47 Fed. Reg. 3435 (Jan. 2, 1982).
so United States v. Hospital Affiliates Int'l, Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 64,696 (E.D.
La. 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 1451 (Jan. 13, 1982).
" United States v. CBS, Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 64,478 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), 46 Fed.
Reg. 39916 (Aug. 5, 1981).
52 United States v. Harvey Hubbell, Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 9 64,516 (D. Conn.
1981), 46 Fed. Reg. 47899 (Sept. 30, 1981).
33 United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
9
64,479 (D.D.C. 1981), 46 Fed. Reg. 41640 (Aug. 17, 1981).
" United States v. Flintkote Co., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 64,032 (D.D.C. 1981), 46
Fed. Reg. 16163 (March 11, 1981).
" United States v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 9 64,018 (D.D.C.
1981), 45 Fed. Reg. 64,757 (Sept. 30, 1980).
% 49 Fed. Reg. 8553 (March 7, 1984).
37 The lower HHI figures are based on the assumption of independent action by
northeastern refiners who are joint owners of Colonial Pipeline, a pipeline that runs from
Texas to the northeast; the higher HHI figures are based on the assumption that the
northeastern refiners attempt to maximize joint profits and block expansion of the
pipeline.
These HHI figures are for terminal capacity.
"i' The lower HHI figure is based on capacity and assumes owners of a joint venture
pipeline are competitors; the higher figures assume that the acquisition of Getty would be
treated as a merger of two of the four pipelines serving Rocky Mountain, southwestern and
midwestern states.
"' If as a result of the acquisition, Texaco diverted the Getty heavy crude oil to its own
refining system, it would deprive the non-integrated refiners in the San Francisco area
served by the Getty trunkline of access to heavy crude oil. The HHI is calculated on that
assumption.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1988

49

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 2

330

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33: p. 281

APPENDIX II
DISPOSITION OF CONSENT DECREES OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1-1981-1986
MERGING FIRMS

2

MARKET

3

DISPOSITION

1986'
General Electric; RCA

vidicon tubes

merger allowed after
General Electric divests
itself of tube division

Rice Growers Ass'n of Cal;
Pacific Intern'l Rice Mills

milling paddy rice grown in
California

merger not allowed, total
divestiture required

SpA. Oflicine Maccaflini;
Terr Aqua

gabions used in river
control

merger not allowed, total
divestiture required

Baxter Travenol
Laboratories; American
Hospital Supply

parenteral solutions, fluid
administration sets, flow
control devices, therapeutic
hemapheresis equipment,
surgeons gloves

merger now challenged
after divestiture in the five
product market areas

1985
Newell Co.; Stanley
Drapery Hardware Division

drapery hardware used to
hang drapes

merger not allowed, total
divestiture required

Calmar; Realex Corp.

sprayer, dispensers,
sprayer, dispenser and
triggers

the DOJ lost at the district
court level."+ In consent
decree Calmar agreed not
to acquire another firm for
8 years

Allied Corp.;
Signal Corp.

air turbine starters

merger by two diversified
firms not challenged if a
turbine starter business was
divested from either firm

Cooper Industries; division
of Westinghouse Electric
Corp.

aviation lighting

merger not challenged, but
10-year prohibition on
future mergers

Waste Management; SCA
Services

solid waste collection and
disposal in 20 local areas,
hazardous waste offsite
treatment and disposal

merger not challenged, but
must divest in all cities
where competition exists

Alcan Aluminum Ltd;
Atlantic Richfield Co.

aluminum can body stock

Alcan allowed to retain
stock but must limit
interest in the joint venture
to investment

IBM Corp.;
Rolm Corp.

mil-spec (military
specification) computers

merger not challenged, but
IBM must divest Rolm milspec computer division
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1984

Nat'l Bank and Trust Co.
of Norwich; Nat'l Bank of
Oxford

retail and commercial
banking services in
northern 3/4 of Chenango
County, NY

merger not challenged, but
Nat'l Bank must divest two
offices in Norwich and end
legal protection that
prevents other banks from
opening in Norwich

Tribune and Sentinal Star
Co.; 3 weekly newspapers
and 2 "shoppers" owned
by Luzadder Publications

local print advertising
Osceola County, Fla. local
advertising Osceola
County, Fla.

merger not allowed, total
divestiture required

LTV Corp.; Jones &
Laughlin Steel

hot rolled sheets and strip
steel, cold rolled sheets and
strip steel, stainless cold
rolled sheets and strip steel

merger not challenged, but
must divest Republic's
Alabama and Ohio plants
and no new acquisition for
10 years

American Maize-Products
Co.; Bayuk Cigars

cigars by unit volume,
cigars by dollar volume

American allowed to buy
manufacturing facilities, but
not brand names

Beverly Enterprises (780
nursing homes); Southern
Medical Services

nursing homes in 4 local
geographic markets

merger not challenged, but
Beverly required to divest
itself of 7 nursing homes
formerly owned by
Southern in 4 areas plus
one home owned by
Beverly

1983
American Brand; Ofrex
Group, Ltd.

home and office staplers

merger not challenged, but
American must divest one
of its stapler brands and
manufacturing facilities

British Columbia Forest
Products, Ltd.; Blandin
Paper Co.

Coated groundwood paper
in US (used in magazinescatalogues)

merger not challenged, but
Mead Corp. which owns
interest in British Columbia
and competes with Blandin
must hold Blandin separate
from Mead

G.Heileman Brewing Co.;
Pabst Brewing Co.,
Olympia Brewing Co.

beer in U.S. market

merger not challenged, but
Heilman must sell 2 of
Pabst's 4 breweries and I
of Olympia's 3 breweries
and cannot use Pabst,
Olympia, or Hamm's brand
names

1982
Stroh Brewery Co.; Jos.
Schlitz Brewing Co.

beer in southeast, U.S.

merger not challenged, but
Stroh must divest either
North Carolina or
Tennessee breweries
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ARA Services; Means
Services

textile rental services in
Cleveland-Akron-Lorain,
Ohio area, Columbus, Ohio
area southwest Virginia-east
Kentucky area

merger not challenged, but
Means must sell three local
businesses

Baldwin-United Corp.;
MGIC Investment Corp.

private mortgage guarantee
insurance

total divestiture required

Beatrice Foods Co.;
Fiberite Corp.

custom compounded
reinforced thermoplastic,
custom compounded
reinforced thermosets

merger not challenged, but
Fiberite must divest
thermoplastics and cannot
reenter business for 10
years; Beatrice enjoined
from acquiring
thermoplastics firm for 10
years

Acorn Engineering Corp.;
Aluminum Plumbing
Fixture Corp.

vandal-resistant plumbing
fixtures

merger not challenged, but
vandal-resistant plumbing
in this and previous
acquisitions must be
divested

Hospital Affiliates
International; American
Health Services, Inc.

inpatient psychiatric care
provided by psychiatric
hospitals and acute care
hospitals not owned by
State of Louisana;
submarket of private
psychiatric inpatient care in
all of New Orleans

merger not challenged, but
Hospital Affiliates must
divest two psychiatric
hospitals in local Louisana
area and agree not to
acquire hospitals in local
Louisana area for 10 years

1981
Columbia Broadcasting
System; Fawcett
Publications

mass market paperback
publishing

merger not challenged, but
CBS agrees to sell its mass
market paperback
subsidiary and not acquire
another

Harvey Hubbell; Ohio
Brass

underground power
distribution equipment
utilized in coal mining

merger not challenged, but
Hubbell must divest a
custom underground power
distribution equipment
facility and no such
acquisition for 10 years

E.I.duPont de Nemours &
Co.; Conoco

nylon
acrylic fibers

merger not challenged, but
duPont required to
purchase interest of a
competitor who had an
interest in a joint venture
with Conoco

The Flintkote Co.; HomeCrete Division of Corsen

dry-mixed concrete
products
Wash.-Bait. market
Phila.-NY market

merger not challenged, but
2 plants in Virginia and I
in New Jersey must be
divested
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Wheelabrator-Frye;
Pullman

HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
industrial and power plant
chimneys, electric arc
furnaces

333

merger not challenged, but
must divest chimney
division of Wheelabrator
and electric furnace
division of either firm

Federal Trade Commission Consent Decree
Texaco, Inc.;
Getty Oil Co.

(1) manufacture and
transportation of refined
light oil products;
(2) wholesale distribution
of oil and gasoline7 in
northeastern U.S.;

(3) pipeline transportation
Colorado;

(4) sale, pipeline
transportation, and refining
of heavy crude oil in
California'

merger not challenged, but
Texaco required to divest
Eagle Point refinery in NJ.
and must support proposals
to expand pipeline to N.J.,
require Texaco to divest
Getty's northeast marketing
properties, including
terminals, storage tanks
and retail stations,
divest Getty's pipeline,
refining, and marketing
properties in Rocky
Mountain, southwestern
and midwestern states,
require Texaco to provide
Getty heavy crude oil to
former Getty customers
until mid-1989, offer access
for 10 years to Getty
customers using pipeline in
Los Angeles

Because of its importance in terms of size, the consent decree between the Federal
Trade Commission and Texaco is included at the end of this Appendix.
- The first firm is the acquiring firm, the second firm or firms are the acquired firms.
Unless otherwise indicated, the geographic market is nationwide.
Citations to the cases and to the competitive impact statements are given in Appendix I,
supra.
The year is the year the consent decree was approved by the courts. Consent decrees
approved in 1981 or later are considered as part of the Reagan Adminstration's record
even if they were begun under the Carter Administration since the current administration
can always drop litigation of which it does not approve.
United States v. Calmar, Inc., 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,588 (D. N.J. 1985).
7 These HHI figures are for terminal capacity.
If as a result of the acquisition, Texaco diverted the Getty heavy crude oil to its own
refining system, it would deprive the non-integrated refiners in the San Francisco area
served by the Getty trunkline of access to heavy crude oil. The HHI is calculated on that
assumption.
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